

THE IMPACT OF PRESIDENTIAL DECISION DIRECTIVE 25 ON
INTERVENTION POLICY FOR COMPLEX EMERGENCIES

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

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
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
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
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ABSTRACT

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In response to the increasing number of post-Cold War interventions, the Clinton administration conducted a detailed review of American policy to clarify when, why, and how the United States intervenes abroad. One document from the policy review is Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25), The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations.

This thesis examines the impact of PDD-25 on future intervention decisions, focusing on "complex emergencies." Complex emergencies are those cases which defy categorization into the standard military terminology because they require multiple types of missions to respond to a complicated situation involving societal, political, and economic chaos with human suffering. In examining the impact of PDD-25 on these cases, this thesis reviews current concepts concerning both complex emergencies and intervention, compares PDD-25 with recent intervention policies, and analyzes PDD-25 based on the characteristics of sound military doctrine.

PDD-25 is an improvement of previous policy but still lacks a detailed appreciation of conducting interventions, especially in complex emergencies. Inconsistencies between PDD-25 and the requirements of intervention exist concerning clarity of national interests; a tendency toward self-deterrence; preclusion of the possibility of early intervention; concerns for international legal precedents; and expectations of short duration, low costs, and absolute impartiality.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

IFOR	Implementation Forces
MOOTW	Military Operations Other Than War
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCA	National Command Authorities
NEO	Noncombatant Evacuation Operations
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
NSC	National Security Council
NSS	National Security Strategy
PDD	Presidential Decision Directive
SF	Special Forces
U.N.	United Nations
U.S.	United States

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

During the post-Cold War era, the amount of military intervention has increased throughout the world as the restraints of the bipolar superpower confrontation lifted. These interventions have been multilateral (sponsored by either the United Nations (U.N.), a regional organization, or an ad hoc coalition) or unilateral (e.g., United States (U.S.) invasion of Panama) operations. The United States has intervened with varying success in Panama, Kuwait, Northern Iraq, Somalia, and Haiti.

These interventions have prompted a detailed policy review to clearly establish criteria for assessing whether America should become involved or not in the future. In interventions prior to Panama, U.S. actions were justified in terms of clearly defined national interests, such as containing communism and maintaining stability throughout the world. The call for clarification of when and why to intervene came from many sources. Demands for this review derive much of their impetus from humanitarian concerns and attempts to install and support a "new world order." The Clinton administration drafted a review document as U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali released his Agenda for Peace and the U.S. Senate published a study Reform of the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: A Mandate for Change. In May 1994, the Clinton administration formally released its policy document.

This thesis examines that product of this policy review, Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25), The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations. Specifically, it examines how PDD-25 will influence American decisions to intervene in the

future. In examining the criteria from PDD-25, the focus is on commitment of U.S. force into complex emergencies, those situations where the combination of multiple missions and a dynamic and challenging political, military, and social environment complicate U.S. decisions to intervene the most.

The thesis explores the impact of PDD-25 within the realm of the strategic decision making process and the specific decision to intervene. To properly focus on the impact, the following questions are also addressed: What are the characteristics of complex emergencies? What are the international and domestic considerations prior to a decision to intervene? What are the significant issues in the timing required to intervene? Are there advantages and costs of early intervention or of delayed, deliberate intervention? What is the current U.S. policy for intervention? Are there any problems inherent in American policy that limit the likelihood of intervention or the possibility of early intervention?

American Policy and the Debate on Intervention in Bosnia

Bosnia-Herzegovina is the case most often cited to justify the need for a policy review and the establishment of a set of criteria for the use of American military power in interventions. Numerous American and international statesman and strategists have argued both sides of the issue on whether the U.S. should have become more involved sooner or remain uninvolved even today. As America, after many years of policy debate, has finally introduced major U.S. ground forces into Bosnia, public officials have still not reached closure in the debate on whether the intervention was warranted.

The rationale for early and decisive involvement focuses on the demand of part of the public to act quickly to stop the suffering and ethnic cleansing. Arguments for decisive intervention stress the belief that America must demonstrate the commitment of the U.S. and U.N. to stop ethnic wars and establish a "new world order." Early intervention is advocated to

demonstrate American leadership, to stabilize the Balkans and all of Europe, and to act while the costs are lower than intervening in a larger (and possibly inevitable) Balkan war.

Strong arguments against intervention in Bosnia have also been advanced. Some neo-isolationists argue that America should reduce its military involvement and presence in the world and pursue only the more fundamental interests abroad. Although still a minority, this isolationist faction can find support in opposing many proposed or actual interventions by raising the pertinent issues of national interests, objectives, and costs. Numerous politicians, statesmen, military leaders, and scholars argue that America has no enduring vital national interests that are at risk in Bosnia and should not get involved.

An alternative perspective holds that the Balkans represent an eternal quagmire that has been and remains insoluble. The lack of attainable objectives makes nonintervention clearly prudent. Even if there were clear national interests and feasible objectives, the costs of intervention in resources (most importantly in American lives) would not be acceptable. In addition to these rational objections based on policy, America has arguably become a nation in which policy makers are easily swayed by public opinion. The result is that many political leaders are hesitant to act unless they perceive a clear public mandate.

The American public's willingness to support U.S. operations in these complex emergencies is unclear. Strong isolationist tendencies and concern for casualties restrain the desire for intervention while, at the same time, humanitarian and democratic aspirations encourage intervention.

Against this backdrop, President Clinton issued PDD-25 on 25 May 1994 and established criteria for U.S. involvement in peace operations and for reforming multilateral peace operations. PDD-25 establishes criteria for U.S. support to U.N. peace operations, both in terms of what the U.S. will support in the U.N. Security Council and what the U.S. will support with troops. In a

sense, PDD-25 creates a set of criteria similar to the Weinberger or Powell Doctrines for commitment of U.S. forces to combat. PDD-25's criteria aim at determining when the U.S. should become involved in interventions that include peacekeeping and other types of military operations other than war (MOOTW).

In addition to the criteria for involvement established in PDD-25, the Clinton administration's A National Security Strategy (NSS) of Engagement and Enlargement, published in February 1995, articulated the principle that the U.S. would commit troops for humanitarian interests. The rubric of humanitarian interests will potentially expand the role of the U.S. Armed Forces beyond its traditional missions of deterrence and defense of vital and important interests.

When combined with PDD-25, this current NSS ostensibly sets the guidelines for future interventions. Timely intervention in complex emergencies requires identification of a pending problem, a determination that intervention is in the national interest, and an established objective, end state, and exit strategy. The administration has set up the parameters of its decision making for future intervention. What remains to be seen is how this policy will impact on U.S. future use of force in MOOTW. Will it prevent timely intervention? Will it limit use of military forces to only cases of last resort?

This reemphasizes the salience of the thesis question of the paper: How does Presidential Decision Directive 25 influence American decisions to intervene militarily in complex emergencies?

Difficulties in Intervention in Complex Emergencies

The increasingly complex nature of most recent uses of military forces and the scrutiny of public support for these operations were the impetus for the Clinton administration's review of intervention policy. Most of the previous guidelines (i.e., Weinberger and Powell) for the use of American military power addressed committing forces for war where American national interests

were clearly at stake and the objectives and end states clearly set forth. The situations in Bosnia, Somalia, and Haiti have caused the U.S. to readdress its basic policy and determine how to apply it to these more complicated MOOTW scenarios.

The nature of the situations in which the U.S. has intervened complicates the process of determining if intervention is appropriate. Doctrinal developments have attempted to more clearly define MOOTW and have evolved in the past decade to capture the experiences of recent interventions. While defining discreet types of operations and attempting to fit each experience into a convenient and manageable category, it has become clear that in many emerging crisis situations two or more MOOTW overlap, often with divergent objectives. In Somalia and Haiti, the roles of humanitarian assistance, nation building, and peace enforcement have been executed in a complex situation of ethnic, cultural, and economic turmoil.

To date, most of the discussion has focused on completing each operation as a distinct action that can fit into the broad spectrum of international relations encompassing peace, conflict, and war. As noted above, these actions are not always separate and unique but often occur simultaneously in an ambiguous and evolving environment. It is this complexity of operations and environment that has challenged government leaders when trying to decipher appropriate governmental actions in light of less than vital interests and uncertainty in determining the desired end state of the operations.

The nature of intervention and justifying the international legality of American actions are complicated enough but made increasingly more difficult in ambiguous environments. Determining the legitimacy and necessity for action in these situations is difficult. Some "simple" interventions, such as the U.S. show of force during the abortive coup in the Philippines, are much more easily understood, committed to, and executed than are the complicated interventions, such as American efforts in Somalia. This example reflects the emergence of what many are calling

“complex emergencies” where a multitude of missions and numerous factions to be considered in order to intervene successfully exist.

The term complex emergencies is designed to capture this general category of crisis of man-made (or man-exacerbated) situations which include a combination of humanitarian suffering with political, ethnic, social, military, and/or economic causes. These situations will usually require military support and humanitarian assistance while also requiring other MOOTW activities (e.g., peace enforcement or nation building). These situations often are characterized by a weak or nonexistent government in the nation subjected to intervention.¹

Complex emergencies reflect the necessity to conduct operations in extremely fluid and ambiguous circumstances. The breakdown of a cohesive society, in one or more forms, is an integral part of the definition of the phenomenon of complex emergencies. Whether the breakdown is along political, economic, ethnic, or cultural lines, it presents an extreme challenge to intervention and presents American policy makers with the most difficult problem set from which to determine if intervention is warranted.

The MOOTW Environment in Army Doctrine

A quick look at one doctrinal model highlights the simplicity Army doctrine has attempted to force onto a complex phenomenon. Figure 1 is extracted from the Army’s keystone doctrinal manual FM 100-5, Operations.² The figure creates a false and simplistic view of the environment and an impression that the types of missions provided in examples fit neatly into each state of the environment. One is led to conclude that matching the appropriate operation for the appropriate environment is an easy matter.

In actuality, the environment is often more complex and the line between war, conflict, and peace becomes increasingly gray. Additionally, the figure does show the potential for combat and noncombat operations occurring in the various environments. While this figure provides an

initial framework to begin study of operations, it is of most use in those circumstances which neatly fit the model (e.g., attack to win in a state of war) but breaks down when the tough cases that this thesis focuses on are addressed: multiple, potentially conflicting operations conducted simultaneously in the same complex theater.

STATES OF ENVIRONMENT	GOAL	MILITARY OPERATIONS			EXAMPLES
WAR	Fight & Win	War	C O M		Large-scale combat operations Attack Defend
CONFLICT	Deter War & Resolve Conflict	Other Than War	B A T	N O N C O M	Strikes & Raids Peace Enforcement Support to Insurgency Antiterrorism Peacekeeping NEO
PEACETIME	Promote Peace	Other Than War		B A T	Counterdrug Disaster Relief Civil Support Peace Building Nation Assistance

Figure 1. Range of Military Operations

FM 100-23, Peace Operations, provides a more vivid description of the complex variables to be expected in an other-than-war environment. The identity of belligerents is less certain, there are often multiple, loosely organized factions (to include criminal elements) with competing agendas, and interactions with other U.S. agencies and "friendly" nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are likely. The objectives are less concrete and more highly political, with settlement

replacing victory as the primary measure of success. Military efforts overlap with diplomatic, economic, informational, and humanitarian efforts in pursuing political objective(s) in a complex, ambiguous environment. The success of any of these efforts or the success of different components of the military effort is likely to affect the success of the others.³

The key variables for successful peace operations, as identified in FM 100-23, are the level of consent to the peace mission, the level of force required to accomplish the mission, and the degree of impartiality required.⁴ Each of these variables can quickly interact with the others and the environment and change the basic conditions of the operation. For example, a perception that impartiality has changed to favoring one side can undermine the level of consent, changing the nature of the mission from peacekeeping to peace enforcement and raise the level of force required.

The role of the environment in complicating operations cannot be overstated. FM 100-23 further identifies the need to consider additional factors in determining how (or if) to conduct peace operations. These factors include the geopolitical situation, the prevailing social condition and culture, the scale of conflict, the efficacy of the government and degree to which law and order exists, and the prevailing attitude of the people. Additionally, humanitarian assistance will be required in almost every peace operation.⁵

Although this quick overview looks primarily at peace operations, it is equally applicable in describing the prevailing environment of most MOOTW situations. The presence of many and competing parties in conflict is perhaps the fundamental dynamic complicating the environment. The disintegration of governments and/or the rise of competing ethnic and communal factions underlie most MOOTW operations, increasing the difficulty of deciding to intervene. Intervening for clear and vital interests against an identifiable enemy is the easy case to decide. It is in those cases where interests and enemy are less clear and the objective ambiguous that the decision to get

involved is more problematic. That is the reason why clearer criteria are essential to allow better selection of when and where to intervene.

Intervention, Interests, and Key Considerations

The debate in the U.S. on intervention in Bosnia has had to grapple with tough choices on the appropriate interests, objectives, methods, and resources. Just as the ambiguity of complex emergencies complicates the decision making process, the policy debate has also been hampered by the lack of common vocabulary in which to frame the discussion. The most often discussed definitional issues center on the concepts of intervention, national interests, and an understanding of the key consideration in deciding whether or not to intervene.

Defining intervention is both a simple and complex task. It is most often thought of as one nation involving itself in another's affairs. However, this does not capture the broad and diverse methods and intents available for intervention. Many experts use the term but few define it. This paper will use the following definition:

Interference usually by force or the threat of force by one or several states into affairs which are within the jurisdiction of another state in pursuance of their own interests (such as to compel or prevent an action or to maintain or alter a condition). Intervention is not necessarily lawful or unlawful but it does break a conventional pattern of international relations.⁶

Some key distinctions about intervention arise from this definition. Intervention can take place with or without invitation. Intervention includes all interference whether it is viewed as justified and legal or not from the perspective of the intervening party, the country interfered with, or the international community. Intervention does not include routine military exchanges, exercises, and low-level Special Forces (SF) assistance that is programmed in planning normal operations.

American military intervention is conducted primarily through the commitment of forces to contingency operations. Many MOOTW operations undertaken in complicated circumstances

are properly construed as interventions into another nation's affairs. American actions, especially where governmental authority is weak or nonexistent, may be within the bounds of international law but clearly disrupt the pattern of normal international relations.

In order to understand the motivations which prompt intervention, it is important to understand the concept of national interests. Surprisingly, it is often easier to find agreement on how to define the terms vital and important interests than it is to agree on what those interests are. The most recent National Security Strategy defines these terms as follows:

Vital interests are those interests which are of broad, overriding importance to the survival, security and vitality of America's national entity--the defense of U.S. territory, citizens, allies and economic well being. America will do whatever it takes to defend these interests, including--when necessary--the unilateral and decisive use of military power.⁷

Important interests involve those cases where the interests at stake do not affect America's national survival, but do affect the national well-being and the character of the world in which we live. In such cases, military forces should only be used if they advance U.S. interests, they are likely to be able to accomplish their objectives, the costs and risks of their employment are commensurate with the interests at stake, and other means have been tried and have failed to achieve American objectives.⁸

To these two traditional types of national interests, the current NSS has added a third, humanitarian interests. Prior to the 1995 NSS, national interests had normally been construed in terms of purely American importance. A prioritized enumeration of interests could be categorized along a continuum from survival to vital to important to other/peripheral in terms of importance to the nation.⁹ With the new NSS, the notion of broader, transnational humanitarian interests is raised. These interests focus on those conditions when the use of American armed forces may be appropriate, when a humanitarian catastrophe dwarfs the ability of civilian relief agencies to

respond, when the need for relief is urgent and only the military has the ability to jump-start the longer-term response to the disaster, when the response requires resources unique to the military, and when the risk to American troops is minimal.¹⁰

Where American vital interests are involved, there is little doubt that necessary action will follow. However, determining if military action is appropriate for important and humanitarian interests is more complicated, especially in complex emergencies. Quickly dispatching Marines to assist in flood relief in Bangladesh proved a relatively simple, successful operation. On the other hand, responding to humanitarian interests in complex emergencies often entails additional interests and requirements in which a clean humanitarian assistance missions is not America's sole concern. Considering this complex interplay of competing interests requires consideration of other significant variables affecting American intervention decisions.

The decision to intervene is influenced by several critical considerations. These considerations take into account the political and situational variables in the crisis at hand. Table 1 below categorizes these key considerations that are pertinent to the study of intervention in complex emergencies. A caution is needed that neither can a single variable compel a decision for or against intervention. Additionally, the cumulative effects be can not be simply added and scored to determine a preponderance for or against intervention. Each criteria must be individually assessed and given appropriate weight by the decision maker, who must consider the entire issue and the make a final value judgment.

These characteristics are examined more fully in the remainder of the document and form the basis for analyzing policy criteria for intervention in complex emergencies. The characteristics of the intervening nation largely drive the general discussion of intervention and set the broad guidelines where U.S. national values may be applied. In specific circumstances, definition of the

interests, missions, objectives, and end states must be assessed in terms of the national will and public support. The stronger these factors may be in a given scenario, the more likely the intervention might be. However, the strength (or weakness) of these variable does not compel us to action (or inaction). Rather, the variable must be weighed by the National Command Authority and a comprehensive decision on the feasibility, suitability, and acceptability of intervention determined.

TABLE 1
KEY CONSIDERATIONS IN DECIDING TO INTERVENE

Intervening Nation	Target Nation
Interests	Political Environment
National Will	Cultural/Ethnic Environment
Public Support	Economic Environment
Mission(s)	Military/Paramilitary Situation
Objective(s)	Level of Violence
End State	Humanitarian Situation

The considerations in the target nation are more problematic. The political, economic, social, and military environment are background variables that by themselves are not directly related to the probability to intervene but exert strong influence on intervening nation considerations. While the intervening nation may reach a general consensus that action is warranted, the situation in the target nation could dissuade action if the costs are perceived to outweigh the benefits. The level of violence and lack of political cohesion argue against intervention while the resultant humanitarian suffering may urge action.

Against this backdrop of interacting variables, the NCA must determine whether intervention is appropriate in a specific situation. The complexity of developing a clear policy

around these interactive variables requires a comprehensive set of criteria for assessing each candidate for intervention. PDD-25 was developed to help frame the analysis of each such situation and assist in the process of deciding for or against intervention. These key considerations are developed more fully in the following chapters.

Thesis Organization

Having briefly outlined the key concepts of complex emergencies and intervention, this paper will examine both of these issues in detail to further explore critical considerations. Following this, PDD-25 will be analyzed in terms of how well it incorporates these considerations and how it compares to previous policy. From this approach, this thesis will then produce key conclusions and recommendations to better address intervention into complex emergencies.

In Chapter 2, the key concepts concerning the nature of complex emergencies are explored. The focus is on identifying characteristics of complex emergencies that argue for careful weighing of consequences of action before intervention. This focus will include an assessment of the policy implications for determining whether, when, and how to intervene. Chapter 3 examines the issue of intervention in terms of the moral, ethical, and legal considerations in making a decision to intervene; the costs and advantages of early intervention; and assessments of critical prerequisites for successful intervention. Based on this understanding of intervention and complex emergencies, Chapter 4 focuses on contrasting PDD-25 with the Weinberger and Powell doctrines, examining the changes in intervention policy. This chapter deals with the evolution of intervention criteria and a comparison of policies.

Chapter 5 addresses detailed analysis of PDD-25 in terms of utility for intervention in complex emergencies. After establishing a common understanding of U.S. national policy and the nature of interventions and complex emergencies and general considerations that will impact on decisions to intervene, PDD-25 is examined for how this enables or impedes a decision to

intervene that is feasible, suitable, and acceptable. The analysis will not focus on specific cases but rather on the broader policy issues. Where necessary, the analysis uses examples of recent intervention debates to illustrate key points and to highlight how PDD-25 might have provided a useful measure to validate the decision to intervene in these circumstances.

Finally, Chapter 6 synthesizes the results of the analysis to succinctly capture how PDD-25 impacts on U.S. interventions in complex humanitarian emergencies and to provide recommendations for making U.S. policy more coherent and comprehensive.

Additional Considerations

Definitions of Terms

The key definitions of complex emergencies, intervention, and interests have already been discussed. As concepts arise in the following chapters, they will be defined where necessary to provide clarity and avoid confusion. Concerning common types of MOOTW operations, the definitions provided in Joint Pub 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other the War, are used. These operations, taken individually, are less difficult to understand and I do not repeat them here for the sake of brevity. Specific MOOTW activities discussed in this paper include security assistance, nation assistance, support to counterdrug operations, combating terrorism, support for insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, noncombatant evacuation operations, and raids.

A final definitional note is required on the terms military “force” and military “forces.” Except where identified, the term military force conveys the actual or threatened use of combat power in an operation. The term military forces conveys the use of military personnel; this term does not imply the use of combat power. For example, humanitarian assistance entails the use of military forces for a non-combat function.

Assumptions

This thesis relies on one significant assumption, that American decisions on involvement will work within the parameters of the established national policy. Executive branch policy pronouncements reflect America's real policy. The decision making criteria of PDD-25 and the national security strategy are assumed to be accurate representations of the national values, interests, and intervention criteria. As regards the interpretations of the national policy and interests articulated by Congress, non-governmental scholars, statesmen, and politicians, these are treated as opinions which the government policy makers might consider. The criteria of PDD-25 are assumed to be broad guidelines and not absolute prerequisites for intervention. Further, although PDD-25 was drafted to address peace operations, it is assumed that its criteria are also applicable to other MOOTW interventions in complex emergencies.

Limitations and Delimitations

This thesis faces two limitations on research, one dealing with the availability of information and the other with the nature of policy making. The restricted availability of first hand information concerning decisions to intervene limits its use and, therefore, summary reports are used. The second limitation deals with the American policy on intervention. As PDD-25 provides an emerging policy direction and as America is constantly considering possible future interventions, the policy may rapidly change in the near future. To properly deal with this, information available through February 29, 1996 is used and the analysis of the policy reflects how it stood on that date.

This research focuses within the confines outlined in the thesis. After reviewing the pertinent literature concerning interventions and all types of MOOTW categories, the thesis focuses specifically on military interventions in emerging complex humanitarian crises. These types of situations were selected primarily because they represent the most confused and muddled

circumstances. In such crises, the validity of PDD-25 in determining America's decision to intervene will be tested most seriously.

This research is on American policy and decision making process and not on the actual conduct of the intervention. This thesis does not examine the operational and tactical focus of the intervention nor look at how the U.S. determine which specific forces to commit. The focus rests within the realm of the strategic decision making process and the specific decision to intervene. The decision to intervene will often include discussions of operational objectives, rules of engagement, desired end state, and other aspects addressing the "how to" of intervention. These "how to" issues are only addressed where their importance affects the basic strategic decision to intervene or not. Another delimitation concerns PDD-25 itself. This thesis focuses solely on applying the criteria for deciding to intervene. The additional policy recommendations of PDD-25 concerning improving the U.N. command and control mechanisms and reducing the cost of U.N. peacekeeping operations are not addressed.

Where detailed ethical and legal concerns about intervention policy exist(e.g. the right of sovereignty vs. the moral obligation to provide humanitarian aid), this thesis does not attempt to pass critical judgment on the legitimacy of past or prospective interventions. Rather, it only notes the key positions of both sides and discusses them in terms of how they influence the decision to intervene.

Significance

This research directly bears on current debate on the use of America's military as a "911 force." The record in recent complex humanitarian emergencies is mixed, and there is some reluctance for future involvement. By looking at American policy and its implementation in decisions to intervene, this thesis identifies inherent obstacles to intervention in the policy and determines which structural constraints exist in the decision criteria of PDD-25 that might shape

the timing and scope of the intervention. Finally, as noted in the limitations, U.S. policy for intervention is new and subject to further evolution as it is applied to new international crises. In addition to reviewing how the present policy will impact American decisions to intervene and identifying constraints of the criteria of PDD-25, the results point to recommendations for improving both the decision criteria and also the broad construct of U.S. intervention policy to produce a more coherent, comprehensive view of how intervention and nonintervention fit into the overall national security strategy.

¹This definition is the author's but reflects the collected thoughts from various sources and attempts to succinctly meld them into an operational definition to present a common understanding of the phenomenon of multiple types of MOOTW converging in the same situation in a country or region.

²U.S. Department of the Army, FM 100-5, Operations (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, June 1993), 2-1.

³U.S. Army, FM 100-23, Peace Operations (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, December 1994), v-vi.

⁴*Ibid.*, 12-13.

⁵*Ibid.*, 14.

⁶This definition combines key aspects found in the following three works: Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, 1979 ed., s.v. intervention; Adam Roberts, "Intervention and Human Rights," International Affairs 69 (April 1993): 431; and David M. Walker, The Oxford Companion to Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), 645-6.

⁷The White House, A National Security Strategy for Engagement and Enlargement (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, May 1994), 12.

⁸*Ibid.*

⁹For a discussion on national interests, see Dennis M. Drew and Donald M. Snow, Making Strategy: An Introduction to National Security Processes and Problems, (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1988), 27-36.

¹⁰NSS, 12.

CHAPTER 2

COMPLEX EMERGENCIES

In reviewing the literature describing the phenomenon of complex emergencies, it is essential to look at the complexity of the environment and the complexity of the operation as well as consider the broad policy implications of getting involved in complex emergencies. In the environment of the target nation, key considerations are the conflict among competing ethnic and communal parties, the differences between cultures of America and that of the troubled state, the chaotic political, social, and economic situation in the troubled state, and the emerging phenomenon of failed states. In examining mission complexity, the review focuses on the probable missions to be expected, the mutual compatibility or incompatibility of those missions, and the phenomenon of mission creep if all potential missions are not considered in initial planning. Finally, the literature review concludes with the likely impacts of these circumstances on the broader policy-making process.

The Environment

Ethnic Violence

The past decade has seen a rise in the frequency and intensity of ethnic violence throughout the world as the restraint of superpower conflict was lifted and authoritarian rule could no longer be imposed over diverse groups and. These ethnic conflicts, which often cross national boundaries, occur in many forms and exemplify the broad range of conflict that American forces might confront in MOOTW operations.

Fragmentation pressures are being exerted on many sovereign states. As the political, economic, and societal infrastructure is challenged, realigned, or destroyed, the basic survival of many of the state's citizens is jeopardized by these politically-motivated confrontations. These fragmentation pressures can take many forms. As the Strategic Assessment 1995 points out, 'fissiparous' minorities challenge the basic fabric of the sovereign state.¹ Violent nationalist, ethnic, and ethno-religious conflicts are much more common, and general lawlessness is approaching the norm in some regions.

The disruptive effects of ethnic violence invariably spill over into other complicating problems. Lieutenant General William Stofft and Dr. Gary Guertner of the Army's Strategic Studies Institute point out that "the patterns of ethnic conflict will continue to erupt in human rights violations, terrorism, insurgency, civil conflict, territorial disputes, and open warfare. These produce economic dislocations, refugees, and mass migrations that can engulf an entire region."² Somalia and Sudan show how ethnic conflict can exacerbate starvation and suffering. Bosnia exemplifies the territorial claims of ethnic conflict and the often resultant dislocation of refugees.

There are many different ways in which ethnic tension may erupt into violence. The turmoil is manifested in a politically motivated violent acts whose intensity reflects the organization, goals, and capabilities of the ethnic factions. Different ethnic groups may use different methods in the same environment, and one ethnic group may be split into different factions. Ethnic and communal violence can take the following forms:

1. Civil rights movements and agitation
2. Riots (perhaps accompanied by general criminal activity)
3. Terrorism
4. Localized communal violence
5. Insurgency or Civil War (with possible secession movements)

6. Regional conflict³

Some elements from this broad spectrum of ethnic violence can be expected in most MOOTW interventions. Additionally, it is important to note that military forces could face violence from different groups operating with different agendas at different levels of violence during the same operation. These conflicts create the requirement for several MOOTW actions, possibly including peacekeeping or peace enforcement, humanitarian assistance, counterinsurgency operations, NEO and/or show of force.

A final distinguishing factor of ethnic violence needs to be considered in our decisions on whether or not to intervene. Because ethnic groups are fighting for fundamental issues of identity and sovereignty, they are prepared for long struggles. These conflicts are complex in origin and not easily solved. Ethnic conflicts are usually long, political struggles between governments and ethnic movements competing for authority within the same geographic area. As such, each side is reluctant to accept the other's legitimacy. Each ethnic group may be composed of several factions struggling to establish its leadership of the entire group.⁴

The pressures from competing ethnic factions and the degree of violence those factions use in achieving their demands directly impact on considerations to intervene. More violent and more insoluble ethnic divisions will require more forces and greater commitment to resolve. Policy-makers will often insist on the feasibility of containing these tensions at an acceptable cost before intervention is a viable option.

Cultural Differences

Ethnic and communal violence is pervasive in the Third World. It is one of many characteristics that create a broad cultural gap between Western or American values and those of the target nation. This cultural difference, together with the political ambiguities and ethnic conflict discussed earlier, are defining elements for MOOTW. When considering intervention

into this environment, it is important to remember that the motivation for conflict is often quite different than what we usually expect from a Euro-centric view of conventional war and that, therefore, the characteristics are also different.

Most policy advisors and academic experts are concerned that this cultural divide will decrease American willingness to intervene in strange, foreign lands. Additionally, traditional Western military techniques may be less suited or adaptable for Third World conflicts. Donald Snow point out several significant distinction of Third World MOOTW interventions differ from conventional warfighting:

1. They are more highly and obviously 'political' with loyalty and control of the people key.
2. The methods are significantly different, relying on smaller, unconventional forces using guerrilla-mobile warfare strategies.
3. They involve alien cultures in which different outcomes do not obviously affect American vital interests or result in a full understanding of the problem.
4. American action and desired outcome will be viewed differently by different groups, with some opposition almost certain.
5. The lack of clear and compelling interests makes justification of our actions more difficult to make or sustain.⁵

In applying MOOTW to these complex Third World circumstances, there is an inherent difficulty in applying Western MOOTW doctrine with limited objectives in a situation where other parties are operating under different rules. A recent article in Military Review points out that "what current Army doctrine defines as a conflict environmental state for MOOTW is actually a non-Western war environmental state." Because this war condition is often based on ethnic, religious, or subnational groups, it is not often distinguished as war.⁶

Most MOOTW perspectives will tend to treat the symptoms of Third World conflict and not the root causes by focusing on short-duration, limited objective operations. As noted above in discussing ethnic conflict, real success requires creating conditions for lasting peace. The cost in lives and economic resources is often too high to justify repeated interventions given our current perspective of Third World conflict.⁷

Failed States

One of the more tragic consequences of ethnic conflict in Third World cultures is the phenomenon of the failed state. The divergent forces pulling at several nations in recent years have led to the complete disintegration of any broad national authority. The resultant anarchy and the resort to communal violence to assert factional rights leads to the necessity for multiple MOOTW missions. Sadly, the failed state appears to be a continuing phenomenon for the foreseeable future. Strategic Assessment, 1995 categorizes four nations as failed states (Liberia, Somalia, Rwanda, and the former Yugoslavia) and projects that perhaps nine more nations may join them in the next few years.⁸

The public's and media's urging for a humanitarian response to the anarchy and suffering in failed states often prompts decisions to intervene. When considering the magnitude of addressing the wound in failed states, intervening powers must often decide whether it is more appropriate to apply first aid (a short-term fix to the immediate humanitarian problem) or begin rehabilitative therapy (long-term nation building).

The initial mission into Somalia was for humanitarian aid but quickly became engulfed in the communal warfare of the many Somali tribes. Fixing the problem is not as simple as addressing the humanitarian suffering, as Michael Mandelbaum argues:

Intervention undertaken for purely humanitarian reasons leads inevitably to two quintessential political tasks: guaranteeing the borders of countries under challenge, and constructing an apparatus of government in places where it is absent. Those are familiar tasks. The first was a principal aim of American intervention during the Cold War. The second was a common

practice of the European powers for much of the modern era, particularly during the nineteenth century.⁹

The mixing humanitarian with political and military tasks increases the challenges and the costs in these complex emergencies. Boutros-Ghali recognizes the scope of this endeavor in An

Agenda for Peace:

Another feature of such conflicts is the collapse of state institutions, especially the police and judiciary, with resulting paralysis of governance, a breakdown of law and order, and general banditry and chaos. Not only are the functions of government suspended, its assets are destroyed or looted and experienced officials are killed or flee the country. It means that international intervention must extend beyond military and humanitarian tasks and must include the promotion of national reconciliation and the re-establishment of effective government.¹⁰

Complex emergencies in failed states require tremendous resources beyond the common military forces and humanitarian aid. This is an enormous undertaking in nation building which the United Nations and the United States were reluctant to attempt during the Cold War. A recent Senate committee report noted that, whether we like it or not, nation building is becoming an essential aspect of peace operations. Once involved, it is difficult to withdraw until a government is re-established.¹¹ The alternative is to accept anarchy in ungovernable areas such as Somalia.

The long-term implications of such a policy are not necessarily attractive to those with purely humanitarian motivations. As Mandelbaum further notes, "The U.N. has limited experience and very modest competence at 'peacebuilding'. Historically, however, the task is not unfamiliar. When it was most widely and successfully practiced it went by another name: imperialism."¹² While few states and no international organizations profess intervention for imperialistic ends, the analogy Mandelbaum draws emphasizes the long-term nature and sense of commitment needed in many complex emergency interventions.

Although there is a reluctance to embrace the need for long-term involvement in such problematic failed states, the hard reality is that the U.S. public often insists on intervention in the face of massive humanitarian disasters. Selective engagement in troubled states will continue

despite problems of mission complexity of 'mission creep' which happens when a humanitarian operation begins to take on aspects of nation-building.¹³ The challenge will be in determining the various missions to be undertaken and planning appropriately for the completion by the proper military or civilian agency.

Complexity of Mission

From the preceding discussion of the complex emergency environment, it is easy to understand how the complexity of mission develops. As multiple tasks are required in the same operation, the ability to keep tasks focused on convergent rather than divergent objectives and outcomes becomes more difficult. In order to achieve success, it is important to understand the environment and the many required tasks and to synchronize them to achieve success. This will often require strong adherence to the principles of MOOTW found in FM 100-5. A common objective, perseverance in execution, maintenance of the legitimacy of the operations, and ensuring unity of effort among all involved agencies and organizations are essential.¹⁴ In Somalia, the success of this massive undertaking required unity of effort and purpose. Unfortunately, the objective of providing humanitarian assistance was undermined by the competing objectives of nation assistance and chasing Aideed which undermined legitimacy and impartiality, eventually decreasing popular support.

Integrating the various activities involved is always difficult. Both the U.N. and U.S. have had problems combining different agencies (both internal to the U.N. and NGOs) with the political and military components of the operation. In Somalia, for example, military operations required integration with humanitarian assistance programs and other civilian programs such as human rights, electoral campaigns, and economic rehabilitation.¹⁵

The challenges caused by this mission complexity must be considered if success is to be possible. While understanding the enormity of the challenge up front might discourage

involvement, the cost of ignoring the ancillary tasks in complex emergencies invites the possibility of 'mission creep' or failure. Although certain tasks may be assigned to political agencies, the entire project must be addressed as a whole. Even nominally political actions will often require military support, such as persuasion and negotiations with local military and political officials, humanitarian relief, the provision of safe passage and convoys, protection of the cultivation of crops, providing for safe elections, supervising human rights compliance, and support to nation building (to include civil affairs, civil police, reconstruction, and rehabilitation).¹⁶ Mixing the military aspects of the operation is difficult enough without the political aspects essential to MOOTW missions. Table 2 shows the relationship between key MOOTW activities, related MOOTW operations, and the level of conflict in possible operations during complex emergencies.

TABLE 2
HYPOTHETICAL COMPLEX EMERGENCIES

CONFLICT ENVIRONMENT	PRIMARY MOOTW MISSION	ADDITIONAL MOOTW MISSION(S)
RIOTS, CRIME, COMMUNAL VIOLENCE, CIVIL WAR, TERRORISM	HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE	PEACEKEEPING PEACEMAKING, NATION ASSISTANCE, COUNTER-DRUG & COUNTER-TERRORISM
RIOTS, CRIME, COMMUNAL VIOLENCE, TERRORISM	PEACEKEEPING	HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, NATION ASSISTANCE
RIOTS, CRIME, COMMUNAL VIOLENCE, CIVIL WAR, REGIONAL WAR TERRORISM	PEACE ENFORCEMENT	HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, NATION ASSISTANCE, NEO, COUNTER-TERRORISM
RIOTS, CRIME, COMMUNAL VIOLENCE, TERRORISM	NATION ASSISTANCE	HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, COUNTER-INSURGENCY, COUNTER-TERRORISM PREVENTIVE DEPLOYMENT
RIOTS, CRIME, COMMUNAL VIOLENCE, CIVIL WAR, TERRORISM	SUPPORT TO COUNTER-INSURGENCY & INSURGENCY	HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, NEO, NATION ASSISTANCE, COUNTERTERROR

These cases show only possible combinations that could likely occur in complex emergencies and do not produce an exhaustive list of combinations. Not included are the social and political environment, which in any of the combinations below could include starvation, underdevelopment, exploitation, and varying degrees of breakdown in governmental authority.

The table shows how the requirements for operations in complex emergencies will often require several MOOTW tasks. Maintaining a common objective and unity of effort is critical to success. Joint doctrine notes that the purposes of conducting MOOTW may be multiple, with the relative importance and hierarchy of purposes changing or unclear.¹⁷ Failure to address this complexity may result in failure to achieve one or more objectives and undermine the legitimacy and viability of the intervention. Perhaps the most difficult of combinations in which to reconcile various missions to a common objective is peace operations.

Complex Emergencies in Peace Operations

To more fully understand the complexity of missions in MOOTW, a review of a specific subset of MOOTW, peace operations, is useful. Looking at peace operations underlines the need to integrate multiple tasks in a complex environment. The most common of complex emergencies involves some form of peace operation with humanitarian assistance and possibly other activities.

Peace operations cover a broader spectrum beyond the more commonly thought of peacekeeping. The definitions of the various peace operations are provided to add clarity to some very similar-sounding terms which imply different missions, actors, and situations. All entail the use of military forces and all may be related to an intervention. The roles and uses of forces vary with the nature of the mission assigned and may be complicated when other requirements, such as humanitarian assistance and nation building, are added.

The exact terminology of various peace operations is subject to ongoing debate. The U.N. does not have a set of terms that is consistently applied. Especially in older (pre-1990)

documents, the concept of peace enforcement as distinct from peacekeeping did not exist. As more peace operations were conducted over the past five years and as they varied greatly in the nature of mission, the need for concrete, distinct terms became obvious. What follows is a recapitulation of the key types of peace operations as found in current joint and Army doctrine.

Peace Building: Post-conflict diplomatic and military actions that strengthen and rebuild civil infrastructure and institutions in order to avoid a relapse into combat.¹⁸

Peace Enforcement: Military intervention to forcefully restore peace between belligerents who may be engaged in combat. The application of military force, or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order.¹⁹

Peacekeeping: Operations using military forces and/or civilian and paramilitary personnel, at the request of the major belligerents of the dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an existing truce, separate the parties, and support diplomatic efforts to reach long-term political settlement.²⁰

Peacemaking: The diplomatic process or military actions to gain an end to disputes. A process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlement that arranges ends to disputes and resolves issues that led to conflict.²¹

Preventive diplomacy: Diplomatic actions taken in advance of a predictable crisis to prevent or limit violence. This may include preventive deployment of military forces.²²

These doctrinal definitions show the diversity of task in performing peace operations. Given the nature of the complex emergency environment, it is important to recognize which peace operation is appropriate. Additionally, as changes in the conflict environment occur, it is possible that another form of peace operations may be required.

The complexity of peace operations has grown dramatically as the U.N. has transitioned from traditional peacekeeping operations under Chapter VI of the U.N. Charter (Pacific Settlement of Disputes) to also conduct peace enforcement operations under Chapter VII (Actions with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression). Broadly interpreted, activities which oppress people inside a single country and result in a challenge to government authorities could qualify as threats to world peace and are candidates for peace enforcement. Most likely, these cases would also require humanitarian assistance to ameliorate man-made disruption to the economy and basic services in that state.

The distinction between peacekeeping under Chapter VI and peace enforcement under Chapter VII often results in gray areas concerning the use of force. The term “aggravated peacekeeping” captures part of this uncertainty and fluctuation of mission, denoting the fact that nominal consent of belligerents to peacekeeping may subsequently become intransigence.²³ Whether this intransigence is due to a revocation of consent, a political tactic, or an inability to control subordinate elements, it greatly complicates the task of establishing clear missions and rules of engagement.

The diversity of these different types of peace operations in differing situations complicates both U.N. and U.S. planning and decision making on when intervention is appropriate and what type of mission(s) should be conducted. Marrack Goulding, U.N. Under-Secretary for Political Affairs and former Under-Secretary for Peacekeeping Operations, has identified six distinct types of peace operations. Often, his typology crosses the definitional lines of our doctrinal terms. Additionally, these types must often be conducted concurrently in the same complex emergency. These types are:

1. Preventive deployment
2. Implementation of a comprehensive settlement

3. Traditional peacekeeping (supporting peacemaking by creating conditions for negotiations, e.g. monitoring cease-fires and controlling buffer zones)
4. Protection of delivery of humanitarian relief supplies
5. Deployment of a U.N. force in a country where the institutions of state have largely collapsed
6. Cease-fire enforcement.²⁴

Although this list focuses on peacekeeping, the overlap and convergence with other peace operations and MOOTW activities indicate the complexity and interdependency of these actions. Further, Goulding sees that the U.N. (and U.S.) will be involved in increasing numbers of peace operations and sees an increasing shift to peace enforcement involving more forceful actions, especially in response to complex emergencies such as civil wars involving intolerable human suffering.²⁵

Policy Considerations

The complexities of both the environment and the mission make the policy of intervention in complex emergencies more difficult. The aspects of violence, cultural differences, human suffering, and competing operational requirements argue for extreme caution, planning, and foresight prior to intervention. Key considerations before getting involved in complex emergencies are the length of time required to solve the problem, the demands of nation building, and the impartiality of the intervening force.

Strategic Assessment 1995 provides a synopsis of the challenge when it points out that involvement must confront problems of consistency, legitimacy, and duration. The consistency challenge is in determining which of the many complex emergencies to become involved in and what criteria to use in order to maintain an internationally acceptable balance. The legitimacy issue stems from the need to impose order and the possibility that one or more parties will view

our involvement as biased in favor of other sides. Finally, the challenge of duration recognizes the conflict with American desires to achieve results quickly while complex emergencies often require lengthy commitment to solve the root problems.²⁶

The dilemma of maintaining an impartial presence while reestablishing some governmental authority is difficult to reconcile. In general, the farther the mission strays from an unbiased peacekeeping operation without ancillary tasks, the more difficult it is to remain impartial. The most difficult circumstances in which to retain impartiality are those instances where peace enforcement, humanitarian assistance, and nation building combine.

The additional tasks of guaranteeing humanitarian supplies, protecting safe havens for noncombatants, and defending groups against gross violations of their human rights are easily perceived as "latently confrontational tasks."²⁷ In these cases, the intervening power's actions provide de facto support to the recipient of aid. While humanitarian relief and peacekeeping operations are often considered altruistic in purpose, peace enforcement operations are rarely seen as impartial, and nation building activities intrinsically involve selecting individuals (and by implication the individual's group) for societal and governmental leadership.

While impartiality is often desired, it is hard to achieve and by no means essential or even helpful to resolving the problem. As Richard Betts, a professor at Columbia University, puts it: "Enthusiasts for peace enforcement assume that outsiders' good offices can pull the scales from the eyes of the fighting factions, make them realize that resorting to violence was a blunder, and substitute peaceful negotiations for force." What these enthusiasts fail to realize, as Betts later points out, is that making peace is deciding who will rule, clearly not an impartial decision.²⁸ Further, the decision on who will rule entails the additional, difficult decision of determining territorial boundaries, an act requiring forceful action and assured of alienating one or more (if not all) of the parties involved.²⁹

Choosing sides is often necessary and unavoidable; however, it is not without cost. The side(s) not chosen may see U.S. forces as the enemy and attack them, leading to casualties that erode public support for the operation. In Somalia, only a few casualties were required to cause the U.S. to seriously rethink its commitment to the intervention. At the same time, without choosing sides, impartial forces could only address the humanitarian issues. Once the forces are withdrawn, the situation has the potential to devolve back into the political struggle that underlied the suffering in the first place.³⁰ The dilemma of partiality creates costs on both sides, increasing the importance of clearly determining which role the intervening force will adopt.

Another consideration that must be addressed prior to intervention is the duration required for the operation to succeed. As long-duration presence is often necessary for lasting success, this complicating factor raises the costs in time, resources, and lives of the intervening nation.

According to Robert Cooper and Mats Berdahl:

Ethnic conflicts, experience seems to show, are nasty, brutish, and long. Outside intervention in ethnic conflicts is likely to be particularly uncertain because one may be venturing into places that are not under anybody's control. Outside intervention, whether it springs from motives of interest, ethnic sympathy, or for more idealistic reasons, will therefore require clarity of purpose and operation. . . . Objectives must be capable of being translated into realizable military goals. The intervention needs to have a credible and sustainable source of legitimacy.³¹

Given this requirement for long-term commitment in complex emergencies with communal or ethnic violence, the issue of successfully achieving an acceptable end state must be considered. Roberts comments that "only in rare circumstances can civil wars be ended by outside intervention or democracy successfully be imposed on a society with little experience of it."³² Joseph Rudolph adds another sobering thought:

In theaters of communal conflict, involvement of third-party peacekeepers has been an almost entirely unrewarding activity. *No peacekeeper who has intervened in a communal conflict has yet been able to withdraw after successfully restoring peace between the combatants.* (Emphasis is Rudolph's) U.N. troops still patrol the corridor between Greek and Turkish Cypriots and are still in Beirut; British troops remain in Ulster a generation after their deployment. Where the peacekeepers have departed - the Indian army from Sri Lanka, British troops from interwar Palestine, American forces from Lebanon - the conflict has continued.³³

The problem of lengthy commitment to intractable problems leaves us with dilemmas challenging our basic values. Not acting entails accepting or ignoring suffering and bloodshed. The option to act entails accepting long duration operations and potential loss of American lives in areas of limited interests in actions resembling imperialism. Such an involvement entails the requirement for intrusive nation building, a concept that most Western societies eschew. However, some of our current humanitarian actions, such as protecting humanitarian workers and supplies by military forces, suggests parallels to colonialist principles of protecting missionaries and traders.³⁴

Despite hesitance to embrace imperialism, some political scientists are pressing intrusive nation building as an acceptable and appropriate international interest. They argue that a return to U.N. trusteeships or mandates might be the most plausible solution to many complex emergencies.³⁵ This course is not free of perils, as Roberts points out: "The U.N. and its member-states may indeed have to learn, as many empires before them, that distant control of strife-torn provinces is hazardous, and there is a high price to pay for attempting to bring about peace in such places."³⁶

Although this presents a bleak picture for justifying our intervention in complex emergencies, it is clear that outright rejection of action because of concerns about difficulty, risks, and duration is not acceptable; the issues must be confronted and considered. Where intervention is appropriate, it should be so crafted as to incorporate these basic concerns. Whereas Somalia represents a failed attempt to reconcile the diverse political and military tasks required in complex emergencies, Haiti poses a potential counterpoint where the military costs of a long-term project can be minimized and the political task of nation building can be accomplished in a less intrusive manner.

Clearly, intervention will still be required, as is demonstrated in the next chapter. While this chapter has addressed the difficulties that complex emergencies present to intervention, the next chapter reviews the basic philosophical principles of intervention and examines the policy considerations from the broader perspective of whether America should intervene in any circumstances and, if so, when and how.

¹Institute for National Strategic Studies, Strategic Assessment 1995: U.S. Security Challenges in Transition (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1995), 8-9.

²William A. Stofft and Gary L. Guertner, Ethnic Conflict: Implications for the Army of the Future (Carlisle, Penna.: U.S. Army War College, 1994), 11.

³William T. Johnsen, Pandora's Box Reopened: Ethnic Conflict in Europe and Its Implications (Carlisle, Penna.: U.S. Army War College, 1994), 13-18.

⁴Robert Cooper and Mats Berdahl, "Outside Intervention in Ethnic Conflict," in Ethnic Conflict and International Security, ed. Michael E. Brown (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993), 136.

⁵Donald M. Snow, Third World Conflict and American Response in the Post-Cold War World (Carlisle, Penna.: U.S. Army War College, 1991), 28-32.

⁶Robert J. Bunker, "Rethinking MOOTW," Military Review 75 (Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Nov-Dec 1995): 37.

⁷*Ibid.*, 40.

⁸Strategic Assessment 1995, 163.

⁹Michael Mandelbaum, "The Reluctance to Intervene," Foreign Policy 95 (Summer 95): 5-6.

¹⁰Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, 1995 (New York: United Nations Publications, 1995) 9.

¹¹U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Reform of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: A Mandate for Change (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, August 1993), 55.

¹²Mandelbaum, "Reluctance," 11.

¹³Strategic Assessment 1995, 13.

¹⁴FM 100-5, 13-3 to 13-4.

¹⁵Strategic Assessment 1995, 166.

¹⁶Rosalyn Higgins, "The New United Nations and the Former Yugoslavia," International Affairs 68 (April 1993): 468-9, and U.S. Senate, Reform of the United Nations, 10.

¹⁷U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Pub 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War (Washington: Department of Defense, June 1995), I-1 to I-2.

¹⁸FM 100-5, Operations, G-7, and FM 100-23, Peace Operations, 111.

¹⁹*Ibid.*

²⁰*Ibid.*

²¹*Ibid.*

²²Joint Pub 3-07, III-13.

²³U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, September 1993), I-1 to I-2.

²⁴Marrack Goulding, "The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping," International Affairs 68 (April 1993): 456-9.

²⁵*Ibid.*, 463.

²⁶Strategic Assessment 1995, 172.

²⁷Tom J. Farer, "Intervention in Unnatural Humanitarian Emergencies: Lessons of the First Phase," Human Rights Quarterly 18 (Spring 1996): 14.

²⁸Richard K. Betts, "Delusions of Impartiality," Foreign Affairs 73 (November/December 1994): 21, 30-31.

²⁹See Betts, "Delusions," 31-33, and Adam Roberts, "Intervention and Human Rights," International Affairs 69 (April 1993): 431-2.

³⁰Strategic Assessment 1995, 12.

³¹Cooper and Berdahl, "Outside Intervention," 203.

³²Roberts, "Intervention and Human Rights," 446.

³³Joseph R. Rudolph, "Intervention in Communal Conflicts," Orbis, A Journal of World Affairs 39 (Spring 1995): 259.

³⁴Roberts, "Intervention and Human Rights," 446-7.

³⁵Adam Roberts, "The United Nations and International Security," in Ethnic Conflict and International Security, ed. Michael E. Brown, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993), 226, and John Chipman, "Managing the Politics of Parochialism," in Ethnic Conflict and International Security, ed. Michael E. Brown, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993), 259.

³⁶Roberts, "The United Nations," 231-2.

CHAPTER 3

INTERVENTION

The past decade has seen a rapid increase in the number and types of military interventions. U.N. peace operations alone have substantially increased. Prior to 1988, the U.N. had been involved in only eleven peacekeeping operations. By 1992, the number had grown to thirteen and by 1994, it was twenty-eight. This does not include unilateral or non-U.N. sponsored interventions. Of additional note, the number of cases defined as non-classical, multifunctional interventions (complex emergencies) numbered eight in 1994 while this category was not even type-classified prior to 1988.¹

Clearly, intervention is becoming increasingly more common in this decade. The expanding cases for intervention indicate that some previous restraints have ceased to exist or have been modified in international law or accepted international relations. To review the concept of intervention and to understand its current increase, it is necessary to look at several phenomena. This chapter will review the legal and moral issues concerning intervention, the emerging rationale for humanitarian intervention, international relations concerns in sanctioning increased intervention, optimum timing of intervention, and broad policy considerations stemming from the current understanding of intervention.

Legal and Moral Issues

The rise in the number of interventions has also prompted a serious review of the norms of international law. The standard throughout the past few centuries had been to view the sanctity

of sovereignty as inviolable and to frown on meddling in the affairs of another state. The rights of sovereignty generally overruled concern for humanitarian rights or the rights of minorities to self-determination. What went on inside one state was only its concern. Although there were exceptions (self-defense, protection of foreign citizens), non-intervention was the norm.²

The norm of non-intervention dates to the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, the rise of the nation-state, and the formulation of international law by Grotius. As the nation-state became the principal foundation in international relations, the primacy of sovereignty became the predominant aspect of international law and custom. This resulted in a presumption in international law against the legitimacy of intervention. In fact, many international law experts viewed intervention as an aberration and sign of continued imperfections in international law. Further, they believed that law existed to control the imperfections, such as war and interventions. The existence of imperfections did not lessen the view that such activity was clearly a departure from normal relations.³

It is important to note that the body of international law recognizes only a presumption against intervention and not an outright prohibition and condemnation of it. Similarly, the right of sovereignty is not absolute but limited. Even such statesman as eighteenth-century British Prime Minister Gladstone, who advanced the "principle of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other countries" and openly opposed policies "characterized by a spirit of interference", found that resort to intervention was occasionally required.⁴

Numerous justifications for intervention have been posited by intervening powers. Several have found acceptance in international law. During the late 1800s, the right of intervention was accepted as possibly justified: (1) in case of civil war, insurrection, or rebellion; (2) in accordance with treaty stipulations; (3) in self-defense; (4) in behalf of the balance of power; and (5) on the grounds of humanity.⁵

After World War II, many of these same principles, slightly modified for the times, were still used as rationales to justify intervention. However, the United Nations was formed in 1945 with an explicit intent to seek to resolve disputes peacefully and to advance and maintain international peace and security. As such, it sought to limit the role of intervention, specifically unilateral interventions against sovereign states. Article 2 of the U.N. Charter holds that "nothing in the present Charter shall authorize the U.N. to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement." However, the U.N. does not recognize unlimited sovereignty. The charter does allow for some role of collective intervention by further noting that "this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII" (Actions with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression).⁶

In adopting the U.N. Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in Internal Affairs of States and on the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty in 1966, the norm of non-intervention was again emphasized while the legitimacy of unilateral intervention was severely limited. The declaration provided that no state has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, in the internal or external affairs of any other state. Further, no state may use or encourage the use of economic, political, or any other type of measures to coerce another state in order to obtain subordination of sovereign rights. Again, the declaration upheld limited use of intervention to maintain international peace and security under other relevant chapters of the U.N. Charter (Chapters VI and VII).⁷

As the balance between Article 2 and Chapter VII evolved, limited roles for intervention were recognized. Unilateral intervention, such as the U.S. invasion of Grenada and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, is generally not accepted as justified. Only U.N.-sanctioned or U.N.-led interventions are likely to gain a consensus of world support. The international legitimacy of

intervention is possible in three cases: where aggression is committed against an internationally recognized state, where states massacre their own citizens, and where a breakdown in law and order leads to anarchy and massive suffering.⁸ The acceptable justifications for unilateral intervention have decreased. The international community, while recognizing the concept of state sovereignty, has nonetheless expanded the legitimate intrusion of collective action into internal affairs of other states.

Humanitarian Intervention

The greatest challenge to the norm of sovereignty in the past decade has centered around the response to mass suffering. During the Cold War, the norm of non-intervention was reinforced by the possibility of intervention expanding to superpower confrontation. With the Cold War restraints now removed and with the worldwide expansion of intrusive reporting, humanitarian issues that might previously been left to a sovereign state are being considered for intervention. A rapid transformation in the legality of intervention has occurred. The rights of sovereignty were diminished in circumstances characterized by Michael Walzer as those acts "that shock the conscience of mankind."⁹

The concern for alleviating human suffering may or may not be the primary motivation for intervention. The absence of local governing authorities, combined with the environmentally or politically depressed conditions prevalent in Third World nations, has prompted the emergence of a new term, humanitarian intervention. This term connotes the military intervention in a state, without the approval of its authorities, for the purpose of preventing widespread suffering or death among the inhabitants.¹⁰ This has resulted in a trend away from the inviolability of sovereignty and toward a view that sovereignty must at times yield to human rights considerations.

Boutros-Ghali has often held that some humanitarian issues supersede sovereignty. Reemphasizing the principles of the U.N.'s Universal Declaration on Human Rights, he notes the

“underlying rights of the individual and the rights of peoples is a dimension of universal sovereignty that resides in all humanity and provides all peoples with legitimate involvement in issues affecting the world as a whole.”¹¹ The United Nations has given credence to this view, especially in passing Security Council Resolution 688 authorizing safe havens for Iraqi Kurds which created the concept of “human rights enforcement”.¹²

Humanitarian intervention has led to an attack on some of the foundations of the principle of sovereignty with a qualified right to intervene for humanitarian purposes. Most nations have approached this right cautiously and not formally endorsed this emerging trend, primarily to retain the ability to fall back on assertions of their own sovereignty when necessary.¹³

In turn, this view of occasional justification is currently being pushed into a requirement and moral obligation for action. Many are now pressing the primacy of humanitarian concerns over the rights of sovereignty. This concept even appears as a minor note in FM 100-23.¹⁴ As one international relations expert argues:

To achieve these (human rights) goals in a new era and to insure that national sovereignty will not be abused will take uncommon moral will, indomitable spirit, and substantial, purely humanitarian funding. The world cannot afford politically, strategically or morally to act otherwise. It is vital to national interests and to peace and security of the world that the collective human rights of people within nation-states transcend absolute national sovereignty Because of its position among the world's nations . . . and because of its commitment to the advancement of human rights, the United States can and must take the lead. (emphasis in the original)¹⁵

With this new rhetoric for mandatory humanitarian intervention, the centuries-old norm of non-intervention has been replaced with a call for justifiable intervention for humanitarian purposes. As David Fisher comments: “The more interesting question is whether intervention can also be ethically required - that is, whether we have a duty to intervene to prevent suffering when it is readily within our power to do so.”¹⁶

Despite some reservations, the increase in interventions in the past decade has been due, in part, to this growing call for humanitarian intervention. The intent has been largely to get in

quickly, end the suffering, and get out. The stated purpose of humanitarian assistance efforts is to “promote human welfare, to reduce pain and suffering, and to prevent loss of life or destruction of property from the aftermath of natural or man-made disasters.”¹⁷

As a result of America’s varied degree of success in these efforts, continued speculation exists as to the value of humanitarian assistance operations, especially in complex emergencies. In addition to questioning where and when to intervene in these circumstances, the issue of the impact of selective intervention and non-intervention on international law and international norms must be considered especially given the broader consequences of establishing new precedents.

International Impacts of Intervention Policy

Having given limited official context to the clamor for humanitarian intervention, many are proposing that this is not a right but an obligation. As Donald Snow of the Army’s Strategic Studies Institute points out, “the assertion of a duty, right, or obligation to protect individuals and groups from the atrocious behavior of their own governments . . . redefines the purposes for which the international community will use force in the future.”¹⁸ Although not nearly accepted yet as an obligation, U.S. actions for humanitarian intervention can be perceived as setting a precedent for establishing this as an obligation.

Several experts in international relations see this extension as a beneficial action for enabling a broader, international collective security regime. Following the Cold War, great power interests in the development of international stability and order have converged with U.N. interests. This reflects some consensus among realists (espousing state’s interests) and Charterists (supporters of the U.N. and international organizations seeking universal government) that increased international combined action may be beneficial.¹⁹ This view, and the opposite right-wing political call for U.S. unilateralism, are significant enough that policy-makers must consider the impact of their intervention decisions in terms of the long-term precedents they set.

In pursuing policies motivated by stability, order, and security, we must also take into account the broader, international perspective of American actions. Much as there is a call for mandatory humanitarian intervention, a similar requirement might be postulated for collective security. This perspective is argued strongly by Rosalyn Higgins:

It was not the intention of the U.N. charter that collective security should only be available . . . if other states felt that they had a direct interest in assisting; if it could be guaranteed that assistance would entail no harm to their soldiers; and if the political and military outcome was clear from the outset. The integrity of the Charter's collective security system was not intended to be dependent upon states' perceptions of where their national interests lay.²⁰

Such expansive interpretations of the obligation for humanitarian and collective security interventions runs the risk of overextending U.S. and U.N. capabilities for action and also the risk of long-term commitment to intractable problems. One of the problems of over extension is that many nations will grow tired of involvement and perhaps tend to ignore certain humanitarian problems. Additionally, this over-commitment of resources might lead to other states and entities exploiting American preoccupation.²¹

While direct obvious national interests may not always be evident in complex emergencies, the broader impacts of non-intervention must also be considered. This is indeed a common argument for U.S. action in Bosnia: that the costs of inaction were too high and that the stability and security of Europe required action. The Dayton Accords and the deployment of U.S. forces to Bosnia as part of the treaty's implementation force (IFOR) is often justified in terms of the broader security implications and need for U.S. leadership in NATO. Michael Brown argues that nations often must intervene to protect or promote broader interests where conflict and human suffering can undermine the credibility of regional and international security organizations. By allowing casual defiance of international norms of behavior, we undercut principles that should be maintained and extended. Specifically, Brown notes that festering complex emergencies "undermine the long-term ability of outside powers to preserve international order."²²

Timing the Intervention

The challenge of long commitment to complex emergencies creates one of several arguments against getting involved. A common perception is that America will always intervene later than the optimum time. This point of view stands in contrast to the *jus ad bellum* principle of using force as a last resort. Neither perspective accepts the rationale that intervention is too hard to do. Rather, they argue that carefully selecting the timing of the intervention is appropriate.

As one author comments:

The U.S. should not abandon attempts to ameliorate strife wherever it is properly in humanitarian interests - and capabilities - to do so. By accepting the often unpleasant realities of the world and applying calm deliberation and quiet tenacity to formulate comprehensive policies and measures to execute the policies, the U.S. may experience success in a seemingly infinitely complicated international environment.²³

The issue thus becomes determining where and when to intervene. Although the doctrine of last resort to force is designed for legal considerations in going to war, it has some applicability to general interventions. The traditional motivation for use of force has been as a last resort after all other options have failed. Adam Roberts stresses that patient pursuit of alternatives is important before resorting to intervention. While the media may lead us to demand instant results, a long-term policy with consistent commitment and will can often preclude the need to resort to force. Often, incremental change can achieve what sudden intervention may not be able to accomplish.²⁴

While this advice to carefully consider actions and let alternatives work is sound in theory, America's recent experience with intervention in complex emergencies seems to indicate problems in application. One postulated pattern of American intervention is as follows: a crisis emerges provoking public concern; reservations against intervention are advanced, especially noting lack of national interests and prospects of entanglement; the decision to intervene is

delayed; the crisis deepens and public and international pressure increases; intervention is belatedly ordered and forces are less prepared and face a worse situation.²⁵

Richard N. Haass, former NSC staffer in the Bush administration, underscores the folly of delaying action in MOOTW situations:

Waiting until other policies have failed may limit or forfeit the opportunity to use force effectively. The passage of time may mean the loss of surprise and the loss of initiative while giving the adversary opportunity to prepare militarily and politically. . . . Also, waiting for diplomacy or, as is often the case, economic sanctions to work can allow people and other interests to suffer dearly.²⁶

In supporting Haass' argument for not always using force as the means of last resort, David Fisher amplifies the moral dimension, stating that "it may be morally preferable to use limited military force against carefully targeted military objectives before applying such an indiscriminate weapon as general economic sanctions."²⁷

This philosophy supports the case for earlier intervention into Bosnia and argues that the costs of earlier intervention appeared to many to be significantly lower than they are today. The benefits and lives that could have been saved, according to this argument, clearly warranted action. As Rosalyn Higgins contends, "to have acted when Dubrovnik was being bombarded would have been easier than to act today (April 1995). By such passivity it has become increasingly difficult to . . . see a military solution that is not politically unrealistic."²⁸ Whether Higgins would view U.S. current operations in Bosnia as realistic or costly is uncertain; however, she would most definitely argue that we could and should have acted earlier.

The ability to act earlier requires the ability to forecast or predict emerging conflicts and apply preventive measures. The call for earlier involvement is echoed by Boutros-Ghali in his concept of preventive diplomacy aimed at negotiating a settlement before a conflict occurs or spreads. Even in preventive diplomacy, Boutros-Ghali sees a role for the military in preventive deployment and establishment of preventive demilitarized zones.²⁹

Early involvement can reduce the overall costs of an operation and yield distinct advantages. The benefits of preventive diplomacy are succinctly summarized by Michael Renner:

Now that the Security Council is no longer permanently deadlocked, however, preventive diplomacy is not only possible but necessary. Preventing the eruption of disputes into full-scale hostilities is by no means an easy task, but its difficulties pale beside those of ending them once large-scale bloodshed has occurred and antipathies have been aroused and unleashed. Early recognition and defusion of emerging crises is crucial to resolving conflicts peacefully.³⁰

Diplomacy alone will often be insufficient to prevent conflict. To be successful, preventive diplomacy must be mixed with military force (or threat of force) as another author highlights:

The earlier efforts to mediate ethnic quarrels begin, the better the chances for success. Indeed, they are most likely to be effective if they begin well before there is a concrete "dispute" to mediate. The West should consider not only "hard" mediation - efforts to find specific solutions to specific disputes - but also "soft" mediation - the broader question of what outsiders can legitimately do to ease tensions among ethnic groups who share the same state. . . The most important guideline is that mediation efforts must be supported by a combination of political, economic, and military muscle that promises (or threatens) an effective mix of pain and gain.³¹

By introducing forces into complex emergencies before the threshold of violence is crossed, such an intervention may pay great dividends. U.S. troops in Macedonia are performing this function. However, early, preventive deployment is not without its own drawbacks. Preventive deployment requires the intelligence and assessments to recognize a crisis before it escalates. Additionally, although the manpower required may be less, the long-run costs could be high if indefinite deployment is required. No end to American deployment to Macedonia is in sight. The practicality of intervention through preventive deployment (or early intervention of all types) relies on proper discernment of the situation, interests, and objectives. In short, American broader national policy must be considered.

Policy Considerations

There are many critical considerations and opinions that drive the American decision making process on intervention. Key considerations are national interests, public support, and objectives to be attained. Given the nature of complex emergencies and their perceived intractability, it is easy to conceive of a phenomenon of “self-deterrence” where decision makers could conclude that any intervention is too complicated, too risky, or provides too little reward in light of the many opinions and concerns of the public and international relations pundits.

For successful resolution of intervention in complex emergencies, the comparison of interests and costs would often argue against intervention. Senator John McCain argues that “with few exceptions, American troops should not be ordered into conflict for any purpose unless our vital national interests are threatened and unless all other means have failed or are unavailable.”³² Indeed, a sizable opinion exists that complex emergencies will almost never involve American vital interests.³³ And even if vital interests were involved, other means and instruments would likely be considered prior to intervention.

The skepticism of the experts is mirrored by the public. Gallup Poll data on recent interventions in Bosnia, Somalia, and Haiti show ambivalence and hesitance in the public. In Haiti, the majority opinion consistently saw no interests involved (51 percent) and felt that the long-term mission of restoring democracy and improving human rights was unlikely. In Bosnia, opinion has held fairly constant in questioning the presence of U.S. interests. In February 1994, 59 percent saw no U.S. interests while in June 1995, 63 percent held the same view. Even after the fiasco with the Rangers in Somalia, public support rallied to demand recovery of prisoners (76 percent) while most did not feel it important to capture and punish Aideed (60 percent opposed) or to remain and restore order (64 percent opposed).³⁴

Given the public's reluctance and expert concern over the lack of compelling interests, it is understandable that a number of rationales for non-intervention exist. Mats Berdal suggests that America's recent involvement in Somalia has demonstrated the limits of public and congressional support for a policy based solely on humanitarian interests and that humanitarian principles do not provide sufficient justification for long-term involvement as is needed in communal conflict.³⁵ John Chipman comments that complex emergencies require durable, comprehensive solutions that can rarely be undertaken by outsiders who have both short attention spans and limited powers and/or limited will for enforcement.³⁶

Although these accounts tend to minimize the probability of intervention and to curtail the discussion of when and how the U.S. should intervene, most scholars agree that national interests (primarily important and humanitarian) will require interventions periodically in the near future. The costs of isolationism and non-intervention are too high. Cooper and Berdal provide a list of motivations for intervention that, when linked to U.S. interests, might provide sufficient impetus for action. These motives (distinct from the international legal justifications noted earlier) include hegemonic ambition, regional stability, ethnic sympathy, international responsibility, and humanitarian concerns.³⁷ Although Americans tend to eschew hegemonic ambition and couch American actions in stability and humanitarian concerns, all of the above motives might underlie future intervention actions.

Concern for universal human rights pushes us toward intervention through media and public opinion demands to respond to severe humanitarian deprivation. The public's initial response to media-heightened awareness may be a call for action to "do something" to ease the suffering despite the absence of national interests. Such a knee-jerk response might impel intervention.³⁸ However, over time and on more detailed reflection, the compulsion to respond might be tempered because of cultural differences mitigating the public's concern and weakening

the perception that significant improvement can be achieved. Additionally, the public must balance the desire to do something with the prospects of entanglement in a long-term project and seek an acceptable alternative.³⁹ Given the mercurial swings in public opinion, it is easy to understand policy maker's difficulty in properly understanding it and incorporating it into the decision-making logic.

This debate on whether and when to intervene has produced serious reevaluation in both the U.S. and U.N. Against the backdrop of an increasing number of apparently insoluble cases crying for action, the arguments against intervention seem to grow stronger and the caveats and preconditions to involvement grow longer. The House Committee on Foreign Affairs published an in-depth report on the potential for the U.S. to impose upon itself a policy of self-deterrence due to the high costs and limited support for intervention in complex emergencies that do not directly advance U.S. national interests. Among the considerations auguring for self-deterrence, the study notes:

1. Limited threats to vital U.S. interests
2. Post-Cold War uncertainty concerning the rationale, directions, and costs of world leadership and the belief of many that the U.S. should not use force unless its vital interests are threatened
3. Renewed dominance of domestic priorities, more stringent limits on resources available for global leadership, and the desire to cash in the "peace dividend"
4. Very low tolerance for casualties when they can no longer be justified in terms of resistance to communism or Soviet power
5. The Clinton Administration's reluctance to use force in view of the potential political and financial costs and indications that this reluctance is shared by many Members of Congress
6. Unfilled U.S. expectations for the United Nations

7. The professional military's insistence on broad political support and resources sufficient to ensure success of assigned missions despite declining force levels
8. Congressional mistrust of multilateral frameworks for the use of force
9. Congressional unwillingness for the U.S. to bear heavy burdens in policing the world.⁴⁰

The report notes that against this setting, the collective effect of PDD-25 (or most other sets of criteria) could indeed result in self-deterrence. However, the Committee rejected self-deterrence as a tenet of national policy (and applauded the President's intent in establishing the criteria as guidelines to clarify intervention policy) but expressed concern that self-deterrence may become a de facto national perspective.⁴¹ The report endorsed the cautions against inaction and its consequences discussed earlier in this review.

From this discussion of policy considerations, several key factors in establishing intervention policy stand out. The importance of considering the broader national interests, the national will, and the degree of public support will be factored into the decision-making logic. Similarly, there is consensus that prior to intervention, clear objectives, end states, and political constraints must be identified. Beyond this, many experts (both in and out of government) advocate various policies for intervention.

Policy Opinions

The multitude of opinions have tended to confuse the discussion by offering several similar but disjointed perspectives on what the right intervention policy should be. The U.S. Senate, in studying recent U.N. peacekeeping operations, outlined several cogent considerations for intervening powers. Among these were:

1. Was the force sufficient to implement its mandate?
2. Was the peacekeeping operation given sufficient time to accomplish its mandate?

3. Were the operation's forces deployed in a timely manner?
4. Was the mandate clear to those enforcing it and those upon whom it was being enforced?
5. Were the rules of engagement clear to the peacekeepers and sufficient to fulfill the mandate?⁴²

These concerns mirror many opinions from international relations experts and foreign policy pundits. In some cases, the opinions expressed represent opposite and divergent ends of the discussion. In other cases, they are simply differences in emphasis and perspective. For ease of consideration and to avoid duplicating similar expressions, these opinions are grouped into two factions, not necessarily mutually exclusive. The detail with which each faction addresses a particular issue varies with the emphasis that the faction's perspective places on the issue.

The first faction is labeled the "do it right" faction. It generally holds that intervention is a necessary act and, when initiated, the key is to focus on properly executing the intervention to support national interests and objectives. This faction is represented by the opinions of Haass and Betts.

The second faction is labeled the "reluctant interventionist" faction. It generally holds that intervention is difficult to execute and should be avoided where possible. Once necessary, it must be executed carefully to avoid expanding or unending commitments. This faction is represented by the opinions of Stofft and Guertner, Johnsen, and Cooper and Berdal. The key points of these two groups are summarized in the Table 3.⁴³

Taken together, these guidelines provide diverse and occasionally conflicting prescriptions for intervention. In some form, all are arguing for a clearly defined U.S. policy that establishes criteria for intervention and allows policy makers to selectively decide when and how to intervene. When taken as a whole, one can see that the cumulative effect of both factions, combined with previous considerations, may indeed result in de facto self-deterrence if all

considerations are weighed equally and must be satisfied before action. Given this broad understanding of the spectrum of thought, the need for a useful government policy is even greater.

TABLE 3
INTERVENTION POLICY FACTIONS

<u>Issue</u>	<u>Do It Right Faction</u>	<u>Reluctant Interventionist</u> <u>Faction</u>
END STATE	Victory or exit date not prerequisite. Consider the consequences of expanded involvement.	Seek to terminate quickly at reasonable costs. Avoid unacceptable escalation, risks, and costs.
MISSION ASSESSMENT AND MISSION CREEP	Avoid gradual response, incrementalism, and half-measures.	Plan for disengagement and identify when interests are better served by withdrawal than continuing.
USE OF MILITARY FORCES	Use overwhelming or sufficient force (too much force is better than too little). Appropriate force matters (bring the right combination of forces).	Consider alternative, non-military ways and means.
IMPARTIALITY	Impartiality not always possible or desirable.	Impartiality is desirable.
POPULAR SUPPORT	Popular and congressional support are desirable but not necessary. Media should not determine policy.	Ensure popular support.
INTERNATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS	Long-term solutions require cooperation (by choice or force) of all parties.	International legitimacy is required, coalition building is important.

No set guideline is likely to provide a definitive checklist that will lead to a timely and correct decision on the issue of intervention, especially when applied to a specific situation. The art of strategy will always require the appropriate authority to make an arbitrary decision based on whatever criteria he feels are important. As Thomas Weiss puts it, a "number of conditions being

applied can effectively keep us out of the peacekeeping (or other MOOTW) business” if we so desire while David Callahan rejoins that “if you want to get involved, you’ll find a way to get involved.”⁴⁴

It is the requirement to match intervention guidelines with the current world environment that led to the creation of Presidential Decision Directive 25. PDD-25 and the National Security Strategy provide the current U.S. policy references from which to expand analysis and knowledge beyond its present state as discussed in this brief review.

¹Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, 1995, 8.

²J. Bryan Hehir, “Intervention: From Theories to Cases,” Ethics and International Affairs 9 (1995): 1-13.

³Quincy Wright, A Study of War, 2d ed., (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), 16 and 174.

⁴Roberts, “Intervention and Human Rights,” 431-2.

⁵William B. Reynolds, Intervention: Lecture XIV, U.S. Infantry and Cavalry School Lectures (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Infantry and Cavalry School, 1898), 5.

⁶Charter of the United Nations, June 16 1945, as noted in Richard N. Haass, Intervention, The Use of American Military Force in the Post-Cold War World (Washington, DC: Brookings Institute/Carnegie Endowment, 1994), 160.

⁷Edmund J. Osmanczyk, ed., The Encyclopedia of the United Nations and International Relations (New York: Taylor and Francis, 1990), 463.

⁸Pierre Hasner, “Beyond Nationalism and Internationalism: Ethnicity and World Order,” in Ethnic Conflict and International Security, ed. Michael E. Brown (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 138.

⁹Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust War (New York: Basic Books, 1977), 108.

¹⁰Roberts, “Intervention and Human Rights,” 429.

¹¹Boutros Boutros-Ghali, “Empowering the United Nations,” in Foreign Affairs 71 (Winter 92/93): 99.

¹²Cooper and Berdal, “Outside Intervention,” 182-3.

¹³Donald M. Snow, Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and Peace-Enforcement: The U.S. Role in the New International Order (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1993), 12-3.

¹⁴FM 100-23, Peace Operations, 28. This citation provided is an extract from the Larry Minear and Thomas Weiss work, Humanitarian Actions in Times of War. Although FM 100-23 does not endorse this view, its mere inclusion demonstrates the degree of acceptance this idea has gathered.

¹⁵Judith Mayotte, "Civil War in Sudan: Paradox of Human Rights and National Sovereignty," Journal of International Affairs 47 (Winter 1994): 523-524.

¹⁶David Fisher, "The Ethic of Intervention," Survival, The IISS Quarterly 36 (Spring 1994): 56.

¹⁷FM 100-5, 13-5.

¹⁸Snow, Peacekeeping, 28.

¹⁹Richard Connaughton, Military Intervention in the 1990s: A New Logic of War (London: Routledge, 1992), 29-31 and 79-80.

²⁰Higgins, "The New United Nations," 471.

²¹Roberts, "The United Nations and International Security," 211-212.

²²Michael E. Brown, "Causes and Implications of Ethnic Conflict," in Ethnic Conflict and International Security, ed. Michael E. Brown (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 21-22.

²³Thomas R. Gillespie, Reagan Administration Foreign Policy: Military Intervention and International Law (Ann Arbor, MI: UMI Dissertational Information Services, 1990), 357.

²⁴Roberts, "Humanitarian Intervention," 446.

²⁵Strategic Assessment 1995, 103-104.

²⁶Haass, Intervention, 89.

²⁷Fisher, "Ethics," 54.

²⁸Higgins, "The New U.N.," 471.

²⁹Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, 1995, 46-51.

³⁰Michael Renner, Critical Juncture: The Future of Peacekeeping (Washington DC: Worldwatch Institute, 1993), 34.

³¹Jenone Walker, "International Mediation of Ethnic Conflict," in Ethnic Conflict and International Security, ed. Michael E. Brown (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 168.

³²John McCain, "The Proper United States Role in Peacemaking," in Peace Support Operations and the U.S. Military, ed. Dennis J. Quinn (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1994), 89.

³³For example, see Snow, Peacekeeping, 28.

³⁴Gallup Poll Monthly, (Sep 94): 16-19; Gallup Poll Monthly (Jun 95): 16-18; Gallup Poll Monthly (13-15); and Gallup Poll Monthly (Oct 93): 25-28.

³⁵Mats R. Berdal, "Fateful Encounter: The United States and U.N. Peacekeeping," Survival, The IISS Quarterly 36 (Spring 1994): 38.

³⁶Chipman, "Managing Parochialism," 252-253.

³⁷Cooper and Berdal, "Outside Intervention," 197.

³⁸Chipman, "Managing Parochialism," 239.

³⁹Hasner, "Beyond Nationalism," 136-137.

⁴⁰U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, The United States and the Use of Force in the Post-Cold War World: Toward Self-Deterrence (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, August 1994), 3-4.

⁴¹*Ibid.*, 4-5, 18, and 28.

⁴²Senate, Reform of the United Nations, 11.

⁴³Haass, Intervention, 67-86; Betts, "Delusions," 30-33; Stofft and Guertner, Ethnic Conflict, 10-11; Johnsen, Pandora's Box, 24-27; and Cooper and Berdal, "Outside Intervention," 199-201.

⁴⁴David Callahan, "Fall Back, Troops," Foreign Service Journal (April 1994): 28.

CHAPTER 4

PDD-25 IN COMPARISON WITH RECENT POLICY

In analyzing how the established policy in PDD-25 impacts on decisions to intervene or not in complex emergencies, it is necessary to first compare the criteria in PDD-25 with recent American policy guidelines for the commitment of U.S. forces. Based on the understanding of the nature of intervention and of complex emergencies, the chapter focuses on pertinent issues in intervention that provide significant departure from previous frameworks (Weinberger and Powell) for determining if intervention is warranted.

PDD-25 was designed to address issues that required clarification in light of the many U.S. and U.N. interventions and peacekeeping operations in the past decade. President Clinton addressed conditions for U.S. support for U.N. peacekeeping operations in Security Council decisions, U.S. commitment of forces to approved U.N. operations, improving the U.N. peacekeeping operations, and reducing costs of U.N. operations. (For the entire PDD-25 text, see appendix.) This thesis focuses on the criteria for determining U.S. support for U.N. interventions and the criteria for commitment of forces. These criteria are assumed to equally apply to intervention decisions on a unilateral basis or as part of a regional organizational, such as NATO.

Criteria for Intervention in PDD-25

The current policy specifies criteria for U.S. involvement in multilateral peacekeeping operations on three levels: voting for U.N. operations, participation in U.N. operations, and significant participation. They are quickly summarized in Table 4 below.

TABLE 4

PDD-25 CRITERIA FOR SUPPORTING PEACE OPERATIONS

Criteria for voting for proposed U.N. peace operations	Additional criteria for participation of U.S. personnel	More rigorous factors for significant U.S. participation likely to involve combat.
Advances U.S. interests and an international community of interest for multilateral intervention exists.	Participation advances U.S. interests and the general and unique risks to U.S. personnel are acceptable.	Determination to commit sufficient forces to achieve defined objectives.
Threat to or breach of international peace & security exists, consisting of a) international aggression, b) urgent humanitarian disaster coupled with violence, and/or c) interruption of an established democracy or gross violation of human rights.	Personnel, funds, and resources are available.	Commitment to reassess and adjust the size, composition, and disposition of forces to achieve objectives.
Clear objectives and defined role on peacekeeping and peace enforcement spectrum.	U.S. participation is necessary for success.	Plan exists to achieve objectives decisively.
For peacekeeping, a cease-fire in place and consent of parties present.	Role of U.S. forces tied to clear objectives and endpoint.	
For peace enforcement, a significant threat to peace and security.	Domestic and Congressional support exists or can be marshaled.	
Political, economic, and humanitarian consequences of inaction are unacceptable.	Command and control arrangements are acceptable.	
Means to accomplish the mission are available.		
Anticipated duration tied to clear objectives/criteria for ending the operation.		

Clearly, many of these criteria are straight-forward and represent little or no departure from previous policy pronouncements. Those criteria which represent a new dimension to the decision making calculus are emphasized in the analysis that follows. Additionally, some of these criteria, such as interests and objectives, are of such importance that they too must be included in the overall analysis of PDD-25's impact on the decision to intervene.

Weinberger and Powell Doctrines

A quick review of the Powell and Weinberger doctrines is necessary before comparing them to PDD-25's criteria and identifying significant changes that require further analysis. The guidelines and opinions from political scientists and international relations experts discussed in chapter three reflect the desire to capture and codify appropriate criteria for a policy of committing force in interventions abroad.

This desire led to the semi-official policies of Casper Weinberger and Colin Powell, announced in 1984 and 1992 respectively. These doctrines, although never formally promulgated as national policy or official guidelines, have nonetheless been used as yardsticks for measuring whether or not America should commit forces. These guidelines are evolutionary and reflect the considerations of their times: the Cold War for Weinberger, the post-Panama and Desert Storm period for Powell. Powell's doctrine was the first coherent attempt to establish principles for the post-Cold War world. In a sense, PDD-25 attempts to incorporate the Clinton Administration's lessons learned from deployment to Somalia and discussions on Haiti, Bosnia, and the role of the U.N.

The Weinberger and Powell doctrines have very similar threads and have focused discussion of whether and how to commit forces. However, in comparing them to the previous discussions on most modern interventions and the nature of complex emergencies, it seems that both doctrines are designed for a more conventional and overwhelming commitment of forces and

do not necessarily capture what is likely to be involved in today's OOTW environment. Snow points out that, of Weinberger's principles, only the last resort dictum is likely to carry any weight in peace enforcement scenarios. Powell viewed these types of operations as "givens" and of lesser concern. The Powell doctrine, set forth in a series of questions, seems equally unsuitable for complex emergencies, especially regarding the practicality and utility of employing overwhelming force quickly.¹

Former Secretary of Defense Aspin recognized this limitation of Powell's "all-or-nothing" school. Favoring a broader approach which recognized limited-objective operations, he commented that "just when we think we've got the problem (commitment of forces) solved, it becomes clear that this brand new world of ours is a world of turmoil and agitation. And that agitation has provoked calls for the use of military force in a whole range of circumstances that don't fit the old (solution)."²

These two, oft-cited doctrines clearly do not fit as well as they used to. Perhaps President Bush articulated a more current, flexible set of guidelines during his speech at West Point just before he left office. He stressed that interests are not an absolute guide and that force should be used where the stakes warrant it, where and when it can be effective, where no other policies are likely to prove effective, where its application can be limited in time and scope, and where the potential benefits justify the potential costs and sacrifice.³

Comparison of the Criteria

Although this flexible approach outlined by President Bush never received much attention for application in the new Clinton Administration, it did signal that rethinking of policy was necessary. PDD-25 incorporates many of the issues identified by Congress, the U.N., and public pressures and is the Clinton Administration's response concerning peace operations. In order to appreciate the evolution of the guidelines, the next several tables display the three policies with

their key aspects arranged so as to make comparison between them easier. As PDD-25 has more criteria than either Weinberger or Powell, entries from all three situations (support in U.N., commitment of forces, and significant commitment likely to involve combat) are all included. A brief discussion of differences accompanies each table.

Interests and Objectives

The first area of comparison concerns political objectives and interests for action. All three policies place importance on identifying interests and objectives as a necessary prerequisite to intervention. However, as Table 5 notes, each approaches the presence of vital interests and international community interests differently.

TABLE 5
INTERESTS AND POLITICAL OBJECTIVES

<u>Weinberger Doctrine</u>	<u>Powell's Six Questions</u>	<u>PDD-25 Criteria</u>
The U.S. should not commit forces to combat overseas unless the particular engagement or occasion is deemed vital to its national interests or that of its allies	Is the political objective we seek to achieve important, clearly defined and understood?	An international community of interests exists for multilateral intervention. There exists a threat to or breach of international peace and security consisting of (a) international aggression, (b) urgent humanitarian disaster coupled with violence, and/or (c) interruption of an established democracy or gross violation of human rights. U.S. participation advances U.S. interests.

Weinberger's focus on vital interests reflects the Cold War constraints within which he considered employing forces. Powell notes the need for important political objectives. PDD-25 expands to actually articulate specific interests that match the modern, internationally-accepted justifications for intervention discussed in Chapter 3. Of note, while support for a U.N. vote applies to all cases elaborated, U.S. participation must pass a second requirement that intervention must be not only desired internationally but also advance U.S. interests. This implies a clear discrimination between all potential complex emergencies and those in which U.S. involvement is warranted.

This returns us to the central question of what interests are worth intervention. All of the doctrines indicate that interests are essential to proper decision making but none elaborate on what those interests are. This is left to the National Security Strategy to provide. However, even the NSS provides only a basic framework of generic interests. The actual process of defining interests left to an application of the generic to the specific situation under consideration.

Military Objectives and End State

The national strategic framework holds that the military objectives must be derived from and supportive of the political objectives. Each policy places strong emphasis on the development of clear and achievable objectives, as Table 6 highlights. In looking at the military objectives of intervention, all three policies insist on linkages between military objectives and political objectives and national interests, accurately reflecting the military's insistence on linkage following the hard-learned lesson of Vietnam.

PDD-25 adds emphasis on duration, end state, and exit criteria. This reflects the increased importance of these aspects as demonstrated by recent interventions. This addition incorporates the reluctance to accept open-ended commitments or objectives that are not defined

in terms of measurable, achievable criteria. PDD-25 clearly articulates the limits of tolerable interventions in the new peace operations and complex emergency environment.

TABLE 6
MILITARY OBJECTIVES AND END STATE

<u>Weinberger Doctrine</u>	<u>Powell's Six Questions</u>	<u>PDD-25 Criteria</u>
If the U.S. does decide to commit forces to combat overseas, it should have clearly defined political and military objectives	Will military force achieve the objective?	<p>Clear objectives and defined role on peacekeeping and peace enforcement spectrum.</p> <p>Anticipated duration is tied to clear objectives and criteria for ending the operation.</p> <p>The role of U.S. forces tied to clear objectives and endpoint.</p>

Commitment of Forces, Costs, and Risks

The increased emphasis on duration and end point indicate that there are limits to the costs and risks for which the U.S. is willing to commit forces. Determining whether the costs are worthwhile and commensurate with the activity and objective has evolved through the three policies, reflecting the end of the Cold War and the emergence of a new environment. Table 7 outlines each policy's perspectives on forces, costs, and risks.

In examining the forces committed and the costs and risks, there are incremental changes with each iteration of policy development. Weinberger's call for wholehearted commitment to winning reflects both the Cold War winner-take-all environment and a reaction to Vietnam's gradual escalation approach. Powell's questions appear to indicate a straightforward cost-benefit analysis of the military force to be applied and tend to support and urge massive force to ensure the objective.

TABLE 7
COMMITMENT OF FORCES, COSTS, AND RISKS

<u>Weinberger Doctrine</u>	<u>Powell's Six Questions</u>	<u>PDD-25 Criteria</u>
If the U.S. decides it is necessary to put combat troops into a given situation, it should do so wholeheartedly with the clear intention of winning	<p>Will military force achieve the objective?</p> <p>At what cost?</p> <p>Have the gains and risks been analyzed?</p>	<p>Means to accomplish the mission, including personnel, funds, and resources, are available.</p> <p>Unique risks to U.S. personnel are acceptable.</p> <p>Determination to commit sufficient forces to achieve defined objectives.</p> <p>Plan exists to achieve objectives decisively.</p>

In contrast, PDD-25 provides a more detailed cost and risk analysis. The forces to be employed are based on the concept of sufficiency for most operations. Only in those cases where significant U.S. forces are likely to engage in combat does the calculus support decisive commitment of forces. This is not to suggest an open consideration of incrementalism. Rather, in conjunction with the other criteria, PDD-25 focuses on developing a better definition of the objectives and then designing the appropriate forces to accomplish them.

Policy Reassessment

A commitment to reassess and adjust objectives and force levels is an integral part of the intervention decision process and receives note each policy outlined in Table 8. This acknowledges that the environment is dynamic and the costs and attainable objectives may alter. Rather than encourage routine revision of operational and tactical requirements, the need for reassessment highlights that policy makers must continue to shape the broad policy objectives and ensure the means are commensurate with the attainable ends.

TABLE 8
REASSESSMENT AND ADJUSTMENT

<u>Weinberger Doctrine</u>	<u>Powell's Six Questions</u>	<u>PDD-25 Criteria</u>
The relationship between U.S. objectives and the forces committed should be continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary	How might the situation that we seek to alter, once it is altered by force, develop further and what might be the consequences?	Commitment to reassess and adjust the size, composition, and disposition of forces to achieve objectives.

All policies recognize this need to continually reassess the operation. PDD-25 provides a slightly better articulation of the factors that should be considered but does not break new ground in this area.

Congressional and Public Support

The involvement of the Congress in developing and/or supporting commitment of forces to intervention is important to success. While the debate over Congressional and Presidential authority to commit troops to a hostile environment will continue for the foreseeable future, any likely outcome will retain some important role for Congress in supporting or ratifying decisions to intervene. In a similar vein, public opinion will continue to influence decisions to intervene and the willingness to sustain interventions. Table 9 indicates each policy's approach to this issue.

TABLE 9
CONGRESSIONAL AND PUBLIC SUPPORT

<u>Weinberger Doctrine</u>	<u>Powell's Six Questions</u>	<u>PDD-25 Criteria</u>
Before the U.S. commits combat forces abroad, there must be some reasonable assurance that it will have the support of the American people and Congress		Domestic and Congressional support exists or can be marshaled.

In the role of public support for an operation, there is a subtle but significant departure from the previous policy. Weinberger posited the need for support in Congress and from the American people to a reasonable degree. By contrast, PDD-25 only recognizes that support is important and must be considered. The caveat "or can be marshaled" provides significant latitude in determining whether to intervene. Generally speaking, if the policy-maker believes that intervention is justified, he will also believe that support for the action can be marshaled. This is not to say that public and Congressional opinion will be disregarded. However, this caveat does increase the executive branch latitude on when it will attempt to marshal congressional support.

In the case of Bosnia, public and congressional opinion and support were underlying considerations but were not crucial to the actual decision to commit troops. In addition, after the Dayton agreements were signed, the mood in a large segment of Congress supported the action as a necessary show of solidarity for U.S. military forces in action. This support focused more on rallying around the troops than on endorsing the Administration's policy. Nevertheless, Congress had given its tacit endorsement to the operation.

Timing the Intervention

The final issue discussed by Weinberger and Powell was when troops should be committed. The discussion of when to intervene is interwoven with the broad issue of whether to intervene. In broad terms, decisions on when to intervene compare the utility of the military option to other course of action, often reserving the use of military power to the last resort. Table 10 provides each policy's perspective on this issue.

PDD-25 drastically alters the concept of when force should be applied. While Weinberger and Powell used last resort as the baseline, PDD-25 relies on the acceptability of the consequences of inaction. By freeing decision makers from considerations to sequentially apply

(or at least consider) nonviolent means prior to action, earlier intervention tied to the urgency of the situation in the complex emergency is now possible and more likely.

TABLE 10
WHEN FORCES SHOULD BE COMMITTED

<u>Weinberger Doctrine</u>	<u>Powell's Six Questions</u>	<u>PDD-25 Criteria</u>
The commitment of U.S. forces to combat should be a last resort	Have all other nonviolent policy means failed?	Political, economic, and humanitarian consequences of inaction are unacceptable.

Additional Criteria of PDD-25

Additionally, some PDD-25 criteria don't fit the preexisting categories of Powell and Weinberger. These guidelines are: for peacekeeping, a cease-fire in place and consent of parties present; for peace enforcement, a significant threat to international peace and security; U.S. participation is necessary for success; and command and control arrangements are acceptable.

The prerequisites for peace operations define the minimum baseline where PDD-25 may be considered in these types of operations. Each prerequisite, while not specifically significant, is an essential elements of the condition of peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations. The existence of cease-fires and consent of parties is fairly easy to determine. The condition of a threat to peace and security is a much more subjective determination, similar to the earlier problem of defining U.S. national interests. The relevance of the requirement is based on the perspective of the decision maker.

The other two new criteria, the necessity of U.S. participation and the acceptability of command and control arrangements, reflect the increasing probability that interventions will be

multilateral and will require international consensus for action and an effective coalition for execution.

The necessity test for U.S. involvement provides a clear challenge to the view that humanitarian intervention is a universal obligation that the U.S. must always support. PDD-25, when combined with the National Security Strategy, would limit U.S. involvement to cases where the U.S. has a unique capability and where U.S. national interests were served. This criteria helps distinguish those cases where U.N. action is permitted from cases where U.S. action is required.

The command and control issue reflects both the lessons learned from Somalia and the U.S. domestic debate on proper command of our forces. The issue of command and control is also given an entire section in PDD-25, separate from the set of criteria for involvement. This is in response to Congressional and public opinion concern and sensitivity about "assertive multilateralism" and the expanding authority of the U.N. In that section, recommendations for reform are addressed to make sure that U.N. command and control functions will satisfy these criteria. Assuming that these reforms are implemented (both in general and when applied to a specific situation), these criteria will have little significance in overall decisions on whether to intervene. Of note, the section finds that the President always retains command of U.S. forces (a caveat exercised by most heads of state) but that operational control of forces may be delegated for specific U.N. operations.

When compared to previous policies, PDD-25 has expanded and clarified the decision making criteria for intervention. It has incorporated several insights from recent actions and acknowledges the changed situation since the end of the Cold War and the increase in failed states and complex emergencies. Significant, substantive changes are made in the areas of national interests, end state and exit criteria, decisive versus sufficient force, public support, when to intervene (before last resort), and concerning the nature of future multilateral operations. How

these expansions will impact on intervention in complex emergencies is addressed in the next chapter.

¹Snow, Peacekeeping, 32.

²Les Aspin's address to the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs, September 21, 1992, as quoted in Haass, Intervention, 185-6.

³As quoted in Haass, Intervention, 15.

CHAPTER 5

PDD-25 AS INTERVENTION POLICY

Given the comparison to previous guidelines and criteria for the use of force, PDD-25 appears to be a more comprehensive articulation for determining the actual application of force in today's environment. It addresses several of the basic issues raised in the recent debate and is a step forward in including MOOTW circumstances in our list of criteria. While it appears to be a better document when compared to its predecessors, its full impact can only be assessed by analyzing it in light of the pertinent aspects of the world environment. The specific concerns of this thesis are the tough cases of complex emergencies.

This analysis focuses on how PDD-25 accommodates the issues raised in Chapter 1: What are the characteristics of complex emergencies? What are the international and domestic considerations prior to a decision to intervene? What are the significant issues in the timing required to intervene with optimal effect? Are there advantages and costs of early intervention or of delayed, deliberate intervention? What is the current U.S. policy for intervention? Are there any problems inherent in our policy that limit the likelihood of intervention or the possibility of early intervention?

Framework for Analysis

The yardsticks for measurement will be based on selected analytical frameworks found in joint doctrine for military operations. The detailed critical assessment of the PDD-25 criteria will focus on their ability to assist in shaping a coherent and complete decision to intervene or not to

intervene. This analysis cannot treat PDD-25 as a stand-alone document but must include how other security documents, especially the NSS, provide the details to address the PDD-25 criteria.

In analyzing the impact of these elements of PDD-25 for their contribution in clarifying the criteria for intervention, the basic characteristics of evaluation as discussed in joint doctrine are used. The characteristics of a sound strategy or strategic estimate are that it be feasible, acceptable, and adequate (or suitable) to the policy which it seeks to implement.¹

In order to more completely set the stage for analysis, the following definitions of criteria are provided. Although joint doctrine prescribes adequacy as the criterion for reviewing operational plans, suitability (focusing on reasonably accomplishing the mission) provides better guidelines and is used in place of adequacy (a simple assessment of task accomplishment).

Acceptability: Whether the contemplated course of action is worth the cost in manpower, material, and time involved; is consistent with the law of war; and is militarily and politically supportable.

Adequacy: Whether the scope and concept of planned operations satisfy the tasking and will accomplish the mission.

Feasibility: Whether the assigned tasks could be accomplished by using available resources.

Suitability: Whether the course of action will reasonably accomplish the identified objective, mission, or task if carried out successfully.²

These characteristics of sound strategy must apply to the whole of the policy which encompasses the ends (objectives), ways (concepts), and means (resources) used to implement the policy.³ In determining whether or not intervention is appropriate, strategists must not only assess the interests and objectives of intervention (ends), but must also incorporate a specific consideration of the "how" and "with what" issues of intervention (ways and means). The analysis of PDD-25's criteria for involvement must include a detailed discussion of all component parts of sound intervention policy. As such, the assessment focuses on how PDD-25 contributes to clarifying the consideration of ends, ways, and means.

The following figure captures the methodological framework for analysis. The key considerations from earlier discussions on intervention and complex emergencies are compared with the criteria of PDD-25. These considerations and criteria are analyzed using the characteristics of sound policy. From this, an overall assessment of the impact of PDD-25 on U.S. decisions to intervene is possible.

Framework for Analysis




Figure 2. Framework for Analysis

This figure provides us with an initial point of departure to apply the specific prescriptions of PDD-25. A more detailed discussion of all the variables of intervention, complex emergencies, criteria of PDD-25, and characteristics of sound strategy follows. Complex emergencies are discussed first.

Complex Emergency Considerations

Duration and Exit Conditions

Most complex emergencies have significant underlying ethnic, economic, political, and cultural tensions that make a long-term approach essential if the root causes are to be addressed. This aspect of complex emergencies contrasts directly with the American tendency to seek a prompt and overwhelming solution to the problem. Thus, complex emergencies and American policy are inherently at odds on the issue of duration. The real question to be examined is how PDD-25 handles this difference, if at all.

The criteria of PDD-25 emphasize the necessity of determining the anticipated duration, the operational endpoint, and the exit strategy. While these criteria do not necessarily imply that the duration must be short, their actual application in the cases of Bosnia and Haiti indicate that this will often be the case. Once the desired end state is established (for Haiti, establishing a secure and stable environment with Presidential transition of power) or an anticipated duration set (for Bosnia, 12 months), the endpoint becomes a key to shaping the whole operation and the focus of effort. As a result, it is not likely that the U.S. will commit substantial forces in situations possibly including combat in open-ended engagements.

This does not mean that forces will not be committed to complex emergencies due to their long duration. Rather, when America decides to be involved, it will most likely shape the intervention to introduce the maximum force required to achieve the lessening of tensions necessary to make transition to lower force levels possible. While the initial force may focus on peace enforcement operations, the subsequent efforts will be peacekeeping and nation assistance efforts. Further, this will entail a shift away from the use of American military forces (except where unique capabilities are required) and towards other U.S. governmental agencies, international organizations, and NGOs.

Ethnic Conflict Spectrum

Multiple ethnic factions operating with conflicting objectives will likely confront America in most interventions in complex emergencies. PDD-25 discusses several criteria which elaborate on how bad the level of ethnic violence must be in order to prompt U.N. (and possibly U.S.) action. Unless the ethnic violence is manifested in international aggression, intervention would be warranted only in those cases which approached humanitarian disaster or constituted a gross violation of human rights. (For U.S. action, a determination that participation is in American interests is also required.) In these cases, the consequences of inaction are unacceptable.

The dimension of ethnic violence and its apparent insolubility are key in the general reluctance of America to get involved in peace operations. The key to intervention in these cases will be the clear and compelling determination of American interests (discussed later) and subsequent willingness to bear the costs that involvement in such situations will likely entail. Unless the situation appears capable of being contained and stabilized in a relatively short period, concern for the possible devolution of the intervention into targeting of American forces will tend to restrain any enthusiasm for action. The ugly lessons of Vietnam and Somalia require strong objectives and the probability of swift success in future operations. Lacking this, policy makers, in general, and the American public, in particular, will be reluctant to intervene.

Failed States/Nation Building

The alternative to intervention in the face of widespread ethnic violence is the potential disintegration of the affected state. Even if the situation warrants commitment of large-scale forces until stability can be achieved, the necessity of dealing with a failed state and providing humanitarian assistance and nation building support will further complicate the decision to intervene.

American ideals for self-determination and self-development, combined with the economic realities in failed states, make the lengthy proposition of nation building unattractive. Only with strong international support is the U.S. or any other nation or regional organization likely to commit to these efforts unless there is a strong national interest in doing so. But international and national interests were lacking in Somalia. The prevalent opinion now appears to be that we should focus on providing short-term humanitarian aid and on establishing some semblance of stability (e.g. Rwanda). Once this is accomplished, the situation can be left to the indigenous forces with minimum regional security forces and almost no nation building support. Even in Haiti, where U.S. interests are greater than in most African cases, American desire to rehabilitate the state has consisted mostly of political rhetoric with marginal and questionable movement in reforming the government and police and almost no substantive effort to alleviate the root economic causes of instability.

It appears that the long-term efforts to assist failed states are beyond the limits of what international and national policy makers will accept. Until some international consensus on how best to tackle this thorny issue is reached, significant progress in redressing the fundamental problems and reestablishing some local authority is not likely in most failed states in the near future. Once consensus is reached, an appropriate mechanism for implementing nation building is required, whether this task becomes a mission of the U.N., regional organizations, or is assigned to a nation in some form of trusteeship.

Mission(s)

Due to a multitude of factors interacting in the complex emergency environment, the complexity and multitude of missions in complex emergencies should be expected. This presents nations committed to an intervention with difficulties in defining the various roles and specific force structure required. By itself, the complexity of mission will not preclude intervention. The

doctrinal resiliency of the American military has responded well to capturing lessons learned and recommending appropriate corrections. The problem lies more in the area of executing an intervention in complex emergencies than in deciding to intervene in the first place. Still, difficulties in reconciling the competing missions could lead to a perception that similar future interventions are not worthwhile.

The problems in executing the complex mission are twofold. First, proper mission identification is required. Second, the multiple missions must be reconciled to avoid any intended or accidental divergence from the political objective. The first problem is addressed in PDD-25 by calling for clear identification of the political objective, military objective, and desired end-state. As America becomes more experienced with MOOTW interventions, better mission analysis may reduce the phenomenon of "mission creep". The earlier experiences with failure to articulate or comprehend the objectives in their entirety or the subsequent addition of significant new objectives should decrease. Perhaps in recognition of this, PDD-25 calls for periodic reassessment and adjustment of the size and composition of the force but does not call for reassessing objectives.

The second problem, of reconciling multiple missions, is more difficult to tackle. The challenge of divergent missions is embedded in the very nature of the complex emergency. Peace enforcement, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and nation building assistance all require different degrees of acceptance from the indigenous population. They also demand different methods of using available forces and, where necessary, applying combat power. Improvements in recognizing this divergence and judiciously applying U.S. forces may somewhat improve the amount of success and will not forestall a decision to intervene. The more difficult problem is in determining the source of the intervening force's credibility and structuring impartiality or partiality correspondingly.

Impartiality

Credibility of the force is essential to sustain the operation. Credibility creates legitimacy in America, in the international community, and in the complex emergency nation. Credibility stems from the proper combination of the force's capabilities and its manner of performance. To equate this with an absolute requirement for impartiality is dangerous in many complex emergency environments. While impartiality in peacekeeping enhances credibility, strict impartiality is difficult to achieve in peace enforcement, nation building, or humanitarian assistance. An undue emphasis on impartiality undermines the effectiveness of forces executing several MOOTW missions. Non-peacekeeping actions require enabling indigenous groups or individuals. Regardless of intent, partiality is likely to be perceived in peace enforcement operations and several other MOOTW cases.

To develop a feasible operation, it is essential that the appropriate level of impartiality be determined when establishing the objectives, missions, and rules of engagement. PDD-25 acknowledges this requirement in establishing different criteria for peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations, echoing the U.N.'s distinctions between Chapter VI and Chapter VII interventions. This is a first step, but requires an acknowledgment by policy makers that in many interventions the creation of stability is, by its nature, application of power in favor of some group over another. In essence, it is necessary to properly define the situation in order to determine the appropriate level of partiality.

Cumulative Effects of the Complex Emergency Environment

Taken as a whole, the PDD-25 criteria and the nature of complex emergencies do not bode well for establishing a coherent, readily applicable model for future interventions in these circumstances. Due to the many factors involved, the ability to recognize the root problem(s), develop an appropriate strategy, and act at the earliest opportunity will rarely coincide. The

duration and uncertainty of interests will often delay action, except in cases touching most directly on vital interests.

This criterion's weight in basing action on the ability to accomplish the mission quickly and completely tends to undermine the ability to clarify when and why we would take action in complex emergencies in the first place. When the international and national interests urge action, the situation might dissuade action due to anticipated duration and intractability. As Tom Farer sourly comments, "it is the very cases where intervention seems the only means of mitigating the effects of a societal convulsion that are least likely to mirror the Clinton paradigm."⁴ In a sense, PDD-25 has created a difficult barrier for supporting intervention into complex emergencies where diplomacy is marginally useful, force is required, and quick fixes are unlikely. Absent a larger framework, a responsive policy for intervention is unlikely except where exceptional interests or public pressure compel action.

While the criteria of PDD-25, by themselves, are sound, they do not provide sufficient clarity for complex emergency situations. Although many theories and recommendations exist, America still lacks a focused comprehensive theory and predictive model to deal with these MOOTW cases. While more effort is needed in this area, some progress is being made. A recent Parameters article attempted to lay the foundation for predicting and acting in cases of state collapse due to ethnic violence.⁵ This represents an analysis of one facet of the problem and offers some pertinent recommendations, especially in the area of intelligence indications and warnings.

By design, the article was limited primarily to discussing ethnic conflict and peace operations. It did not address a comprehensive look at the complex emergency environment. However, it does provide a useful point of departure to allow for a detailed integration of the characteristics of failed states, the possible future conditions of conflict and security in troubled

states, and potential responses. The model is an initial step which requires a deeper resolution of key factors in complex emergencies, a broader range of intervention options, and introduction of the critical variables which determine the policy of the potentially intervening state.

The salient points of the article should be incorporated into a broader model to enrich American decision making tools. Any future model must incorporate the characteristics impacting on the decision in both the target and intervening state. Only then will the PDD-25 criteria be able to more effectively guide policy based on a more comprehensive understanding of the problem. In the meantime, interventions will continue to be based on the existing, improved, but still imperfect criteria. The utility of PDD-25 to the broader issues of intervention must also be considered in revising future policy.

Intervention Considerations

As noted above, it is unlikely that America can (or should) successfully intervene in every complex emergency. The consensus opinion among policy makers and academia is that the U.S. must selectively focus the application of force to those circumstances where American interests most warrant intervention. Given this consensus, an examination of the key considerations of the act of intervention is needed to determine in what situations, when, and how we should intervene.

International Legitimacy

PDD-25 is designed to specifically address participation in multinational peace operations. By its very nature, the construct of PDD-25 posits that future U.S. operations will be undertaken as part of broader U.N. or regional cooperative efforts. However, PDD-25's more stringent criteria for commitment of U.S. forces, as compared to support in U.N. voting, underscores the perception that America will not assume the role of world policeman. Instead, it views the need for peace operations as a shared responsibility of the world community.

The criterion that U.S. interests must also be involved indicates some distancing from the whole-hearted embrace of a broad, international collective intervention regime. While PDD-25 recognizes the utility of collective operations and the periodic requirement for American leadership to rally broader support (e.g. Haiti), the requirement still exists for significant American interests to be present to warrant U.S. involvement.

Further, the U.S. still retains the right of unilateral action in those cases in which speed is important or where American interests override the international community of interests.⁶ While unilateral operations are not preferred, they remain a possibility and, with the exception of the criterion of international interests, such interventions would still be subject to the other criteria of PDD-25. These cases will likely be limited to strikes, raids, counterterrorism, and NEO operations in the pattern of Grenada, Panama, and Libya (El Dorado Canyon). While the international legitimacy of these types of operations in the future will likely be questioned, they will probably not undermine U.S. or U.N. efforts to form coalitions for action in more troublesome and longer lasting complex emergencies.

Complex emergencies will continue to stir cries for international and American response given the perceived consequences of inaction. This is especially true in instances of large-scale humanitarian suffering and the severe violation of human rights. Unless confronted, the level of the suffering is likely to increase and reach a threshold when action is demanded to counteract the human deprivation. While consensus on the legitimacy of intervention is likely to be marshaled, the situation will often have expanded beyond the point where opportunities for preventive diplomacy and preventive deployment were optimal.

International Precedents

The issue of international legitimacy is tied closely to the establishment of international legal and normative precedents. Selective U.N. or U.S. interventions present the moral dilemma

of choosing which complex emergency warrants action and which can be ignored. The U.S. has a recognized determinant of the appropriateness of selective interventions to rely on, the notion of national interests. For the U.N. and the broader international community, it is much more difficult to define any specific complex emergency as falling outside of the international community of interests than it is for the U.S. to determine that the same situation is not of American interest.

PDD-25 recognizes this dilemma and the desire to refrain from jumping into every situation by its criteria for supporting U.N. action through its vote in the Security Council. The caveat that U.S. voting support, even without intent to American commit troops, is tied to the advancement of U.S. interests indicates an intent to exercise some restraint on the wholesale involvement of the U.N. in all potential situations. In doing so, U.S. policy, as outlined in this PDD-25 criterion, is likely to delay the acceptance of a universally required norm of humanitarian intervention. Without this international norm, responses to impending crises will likely be delayed as each case is determined on its own merits. Additionally, the uncertainty and ambiguity inherent in this policy risks sending the message that inaction in selective cases may encourage future actions by rogue states or sub-national groups.

The principle of humanitarian intervention is one that does not appear ready for universal acceptance. The expansiveness and costs of enforcing this norm are prohibitive. PDD-25 discusses how U.S. voting support may restrain overly ambitious U.N. actions. However, the criterion concerning international community consensus is insufficiently defined to allow for a clear determination of what degree of aggression, humanitarian suffering, or gross violation of human rights is so intolerable as to prompt intervention. Perhaps this vagueness is preferable in the short term as the U.S. and U.N. struggle to come to grips with the capabilities and costs of addressing various ongoing complex emergencies. Eventually, some standard, de facto if not de

jure, must be established to screen the cases for action based on international community of interests.

This lack of clear criteria for determining when international interests warrant action is likely to be reflected in extended discussions, both in U.N. and U.S. policy making circles. The effect of the absence of a more defined international consensus of interests will be to delay action in favor of discriminating debate. Although the selective application of force that results from the absence of a broad humanitarian intervention norm has several advantages, it also tends to preempt the possibility for earlier, less costly preventive diplomacy and preventive deployment. If these tools are to be best utilized, a more detailed definition is required of the international consensus on when intervention is warranted and on whether and when preventive actions should be applied. Until that point, these tools will remain more theoretical than practical.

The development of a more definitive international consensus on humanitarian intervention will also help to discourage challenges to international stability by rogue states. The lack of clear criteria and the lack of consistency in application may invite states to test the limits of U.N. and U.S. resolve. While it would be naive to expect an absolute definition of when action is warranted, a more rigid establishment of general principles that will invoke action will have a desirable deterring effect. This establishment of an international standard will likely enhance the predictability of U.S. leadership and probably decrease the number of such cases the international community would face in the long-term.

Public and Congressional Support and the Role of the Media

PDD-25 marks a departure from the Weinburger and Powell models in that it does not demand that public support exist as a precondition for intervention but merely requires that it can be marshaled. This change does not dismiss the importance of such support, but rather increases the administration's freedom of action in determining whether or not to intervene. If decision

makers merely assess the potential for the support of Congress and the public prior to committing to action, more timely response may be possible.

In actuality, this criterion has the potential to be reduced to absurdity. It is conceivable that the President and his advisors could make assumptions to the effect that all Presidential decisions are correct and, therefore, the public should be willing to support the decision. Assuming away the need to marshal support could likely presage a failed intervention. A more detailed assessment is essential. This assessment and the ability to marshal support are enhanced by efforts to clarify general interests and to establish appropriate criteria for determining when to apply them. PDD-25 is a good start in this effort.

In addition to the criteria of PDD-25 already discussed, the document also spends considerable time examining the role of Congress and the public in the policy making debate.⁷ PDD-25 commits the administration to continual dialog with Congress and to a more proactive policy of providing routine information to the public to increase the general awareness of the situation and to enhance the administration's ability to marshal support when action is required.

PDD-25 is silent concerning the role of the media as a deliberate actor in raising public consciousness and in prompting support for humanitarian intervention. Similarly, it does not discuss the government's manipulation and application of the media as a tool for marshaling public support. This is not to imply that the Clinton Administration does not appreciate the role the media plays in influencing policy makers, but rather it downplays any official role of the media in formulating the policy itself.

Objective and End State

PDD-25 incorporates many of the concerns of the faction of reluctant interventionists. It insists on clear objectives, an anticipated duration, specific criteria for ending the operation, and a plan to achieve the objectives. As argued earlier in discussing complex operations, these factors,

when taken in combination, tend to create the requirement for a quick accomplishment of the mission followed by the withdrawal of U.S. forces and the transfer of the problem to other organizations. This approach, implied rather than directly stated in PDD-25, will limit intervention efforts to those cases where such a policy is feasible and the costs are acceptable. It will result in avoidance of the intractable or ambiguous situations in failed or failing states.

The immediate question is to ask what is wrong with such a policy. Limiting interventions to cases with objectives attainable in short time periods seems prudent. However, such limitations fail to address those cases where more extended military operations are essential to success, where success is not easily measured, or where earlier intervention with less clear final end-state may be less costly than later intervention with more concrete objectives. PDD-25 appears to have been written to insure that America does not fall into quagmires such as Somalia. It avoids addressing the rationales of why American involvement may still be required and how the U.S. could better intervene in such cases.

The issue of whether international or unilateral action is more likely to improve conditions in failed states requires more study and definition. PDD-25 leads to a de facto exclusion of intervention in failed states unless overriding U.S. national interests compel action while purely humanitarian interests do not. A large part of the problem is that no acceptable alternative to prolonged intervention at domestically unsustainable costs has been found. There is no foundation for a return to a benign form of imperialism. The U.N. does not seem to look forward to placing failed states in trusteeship to a nation or regional organization. Furthermore, no states appear willing to accept this responsibility.

Perhaps the current operations in Bosnia and Haiti might prove a model for successful, prolonged involvement. However, while Bosnia is a test of the military's ability to create and sustain an environment for economic and political efforts, skeptics abound as to whether the

situation can be stabilized in the first place and to what efforts can and should be undertaken if and when stability is achieved. The current military operation is only a first step. Its success is unknown, and the subsequent steps are just now developing.

In Haiti, a modicum of stability has been achieved and the military presence (both U.S. and U.N.) greatly reduced. Complete withdrawal is unlikely for the near future as the necessary public trust in local institutions is barely forming. Efforts at economic development have been considered, but few have been implemented due to concerns about political stability. In a sense, development is held hostage to a vicious cycle of perceptions: economic aid is withheld until political stability is in place, but that stability will not grow until the economy improves. The question remains as to what long-term effects can be achieved and what program will oversee progress.

The recent interventions in Haiti and Bosnia indicate that U.S. actions in complex emergencies are likely to continue. PDD-25 was in force prior to both of these operations, and its criteria apparently influenced the establishment of objectives. However, it appears that U.S. hesitance to become involved in both of these operations resulted in a circumscribed military effort focused on a limited, attainable objective with no public plan to accomplish a broader, long-range political objective. Until the administration creates a policy that more fully articulates the long-range objectives necessary to insure U.S. national interests in complex emergencies, American intervention policy will remain flawed.

Interests

The essential discriminator in decisions to commit U.S. forces to intervention will continue to be the interests involved. PDD-25 specifies that involvement must advance U.S. interests. However, this begs the question of what U.S. interests are. Every time a crisis erupts, a debate immediately follows as to whether U.S. interests are involved and whether they warrant

military action. PDD-25 eludes to but does not identify interests warranting intervention except for the broader international community of interests against aggression, humanitarian disaster, and gross violation of human rights.

The discussion of interests is traditionally found in the NSS. In addressing American national interests, the current NSS does not follow the lead of the Reagan and Bush administrations and clearly establish the broad, overarching principles around which the strategy is focused. Instead, it merely discusses three broad categories of interests (vital, important, and humanitarian) which might prompt decisions on when and how to employ forces (the military instrument). Interests are discussed in passing, often appearing unclear, underdeveloped, and disjointed to policy. They do not receive the emphasis necessary to focus the national strategy. The discussion of interests often seems to subjugate interests to the objectives desired instead of determining objectives based on the interests. By providing an underdeveloped understanding of interests and their role in the foundation of national strategy, the NSS is reduced to a rambling discussion of unprioritized and ambitious policy objectives based around the basic issues of engagement and enlargement.⁸

Failure to clearly articulate broad national interests creates confusion in determining which specific interests are involved in a particular situation and to what ends (objectives) force could be employed. By mixing underlying interests with regional or issue-specific goals and political accomplishments, the Clinton Administration has blurred the issue of how important various issues are and whether a threat to them would warrant application of the military instrument of power or another instrument. Lacking a distinction between interests, goals, objectives, and concerns, the impression is that all are equal candidates for justification of intervention under the pretense of interests. Absent some baseline that a shared understanding of interests provides, policy options will be subject to longer debate and increased political scrutiny.

The addition of a new type of interest, humanitarian interests, further creates potential problems. Until clarified, this type of interest could provide impetus for U.S. involvement in almost all candidates for humanitarian intervention. The NSS and PDD-25 both establish a low threshold of 'unique capabilities' as prerequisites for action. As we continue to possess the world's foremost power projection capability and readily demonstrate its applicability for moving humanitarian assistance as well as peacekeeping forces, the potential for triggering involvement because of this capability and the stated policy of humanitarian interests is high. It is important that America clarify its perspective of this new type of interests as well as how we view the application of projection resources in complex emergencies.

Acknowledging that the proper determination of our interests will develop concurrently with the evolution of the complex emergency, it is still important to clarify enduring interests. This clarification should be provided both on a general (or global) perspective, in terms of issue-specific interests, and from a regional perspective. By clarifying interests as distinct and separate from objectives, commitments, and programs, the NSS will provide an initial framework to begin the situation-specific determination. Lacking some framework for this determination, American policy invites delays in the decision making process and increase the amount of second-guessing likely to follow from any definition of interests.

Cumulative Effects on Political Will

Although few pundits talk directly of the need for strong determination and will, its presence is assumed in most cases. The U.S. will is a product of the interests involved, the objective and mission assigned, the amount of casualties, and the level of sustained public support for the intervention. All these should not be taken lightly and must be carefully considered before contemplating intervention.

Political will is essential to intervention. The temptations of inaction are easily accepted and the case for action must be clearly and strongly made. The cumulative effect of PDD-25's criteria for intervention may be to limit the exercise of political will by creating a multitude of difficult prerequisites that, in the best cases, are hard to satisfy. In the case of complex emergencies, the criteria often will be insurmountable. Only instances in which specific national interests are clear and threatened and where attainable objectives exist are likely to muster sufficient will to intervene.

The cases in which the U.S. appears willing to take the lead in intervening in complex emergencies are limited. Until either a broader international consensus for action is established, or a long-term model for political success is created, or American national interests are expanded to include broader definition of humanitarian interests, more involvement is not likely. Cases of early intervention and preventive deployments, such as Able Sentry in Macedonia, are likely to be the exception rather than the norm. The only way to encourage a faster response with intervening forces is to address a problem before it explodes. This would seem to require the acceptance of a universal standard on humanitarian intervention combined with an improved predictive system that can be used to identify states that are likely to fail in the near future.

PDD-25 does represent an improvement from existing criteria for intervention. As noted above, some further clarification is needed and a broader understanding of the phenomenon of failed states and complex emergencies is required. The cumulative effect of the primary intervention considerations on political will may well be the adoption of a limited self-deterrence regarding intervention in the more intractable problems of complex emergencies except in cases where significant interests are involved.

The present criteria represent an attempt to incorporate the various strategic lessons learned from recent activities. However, a thorough understanding of intervention and the nature

of complex emergencies is necessary in order to craft conditions for a feasible, acceptable, and suitable policy. The current criteria present the policy maker with a dilemma in that adherence to one principle (such as acceptability and limiting duration and casualties) may conflict with support for another (such as suitability and the ability to accomplish the long-term objective). This challenge will always confront decision makers. The best to hope for is to provide policy makers with the best understanding possible of the situation and with a workable model for applying the appropriate evaluative criteria.

¹U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 5-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, August 1994), I-16.

²U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, March 1994), 4, 142, and 367.

³U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, September 1993), II-4 and III-2.

⁴Farer, "Unnatural Humanitarian Emergencies," 15.

⁵Pauline H. Baker and John A. Ausink, "State Collapse and Ethnic Violence: Toward a Predictive Model," Parameters, US Army War College Quarterly XXVI (Spring 1996): 19-31.

⁶PDD-25, 2-3.

⁷*Ibid.*, 3, 14-5.

⁸NSS, 7-24. General interests are discussed on page 7. The application of interests to military action is specifically discussed on pages 12 and 13. Consistency of interests and the relationship of policy goals and objectives vary throughout the document.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERVENTION POLICY

The preceding chapter showed how PDD-25 was less than complete in addressing the phenomenon of intervention in complex emergencies. It would be a gross injustice, however, to typify it as poor policy based on these findings. Clearly, PDD-25 is a great leap forward from the previous intervention doctrines rooted in the Cold War and decisive commitment of combat power. For the new environment of MOOTW in the post-Cold War era, PDD-25 is a significant tool that requires some improvements as the U.S. learns more about complex emergencies.

PDD-25 as an Improved Policy Document

When compared to previous policies on intervention and the use of force, PDD-25 clearly breaks new ground and addresses the more complicated environment of today. It expands the previous discussion, which posited overwhelming force in decisive action, for a more measured approach that allows for many of the actions experienced in the recent past and likely in the foreseeable future. MOOTW is a growing area, and national policy must evolve to capture the criteria and considerations. PDD-25 is the first policy document which attempts to lay out the considerations that guide the decision making process in this increasingly complicated environment.

While covering new ground and adapting old criteria to new circumstances, PDD-25 provides a marked improvement over past policy. As it offers initial policy guidance on peace operations, one should expect that the criteria evolve as more is learned about complex

emergencies and America better defines the ends, ways, and means that are appropriate in this environment. Until then, PDD-25 provides adequate yet imperfect criteria to guide policy makers.

PDD-25 does provide some significant departures from previous policy. Among the most important are the flexibility it appears to provide concerning the consideration of Congressional and public support and concerning the possibility of military action other than as an absolute last resort. Additionally, it marks a distinction between worthwhile multilateral efforts and those where U.S. involvement is appropriate, predicated on the use of American forces on unique capabilities and specific U.S. interests.

Along with these departures from the past, PDD-25 also provides continuity and expansion of past ideas. This is most notable in the increased definition and articulation of several criteria: the importance of national interests, the linkage of political and military objectives, the need for reassessment, and the considerations of cost/benefit analysis factors. In these areas, PDD-25 offers a clear and improved articulation of the criteria for intervention. However, as Chapter 5 points out, other areas of concern are still not adequately addressed in the decision criteria.

The two areas where improvement is most necessary in PDD-25 are the consideration of the cumulative effects of multiple criteria on political will and the articulation of national interests in greater detail and clarity. The possibility of self-deterrence is increased by the cumulative effect of the multitude of criteria. Given the American desires for quick and bloodless actions, the criteria point toward a strong inclination to avoid the nastier situations in complex emergencies. This tendency has the additional negative consequence of avoiding serious preparation for those activities, such as extended peacekeeping or peace enforcement and nation building, where U.S. involvement is less desirable. This ignores the probability that U.S. interests may occasionally require these unappealing actions for which the military and the public is unprepared.

The second area of significant shortcoming in PDD-25 is the articulation of interests. Although PDD-25 does list those international community interests where intervention is warranted, it only indicates that U.S. interests must be present. The actual delineation of specific interests is more appropriately a function of the NSS. However, as interests play a critical role among the PDD-25 criteria and the NSS doesn't provide clarity and emphasis in defining national interests, the ability to apply PDD-25's criteria is greatly diminished. Given this understanding of PDD-25, certain implications for intervention policy in complex emergencies can be drawn.

Implications on Intervention Policy

To improve PDD-25 and the broader framework for policy making concerning interventions, significant changes and further research are required in several areas. Among these are clarification of the intervention criteria, improvements in the policy support process, discussion of international legal issues, and further investigation of the phenomenon of failed states. Within these categories, the following issues need to be addressed. The first four are most applicable to the area of intervention in complex emergencies. The last six relate to the overall issue of broader intervention policy.

1. Clarification of the concept of Humanitarian Interests and Humanitarian Intervention
2. Careful examination of the desirability of maintaining impartiality in different MOOTW actions.
3. A reexamination of U.S. reluctance for nation building and a comprehensive program to integrate all instruments to achieve long term results.
4. More open public discussion of the trade-offs in intervention as compared to American expectations concerning duration, casualties, commitment, and exit conditions/criteria/deadlines.
5. A more fully developed articulation of U.S. national interests and increased emphasis on the relevance of interests to policy objectives.

6. Caution against allowing the tendency toward self-deterrence to become an absolute prohibition.
7. Reevaluation of the desirability of earlier intervention and preventive deployments.
8. Reassessment of the applicability of the principle of last resort to MOOTW.
9. Development of a more focused predictive model for MOOTW intervention.
10. The precedent that intervention might have on international law, specifically when establishing national obligations or establishing a collective security regime.

Implications for Complex Emergencies

The complicated and often intractable nature of complex emergencies will make the formulation of universal and immutable criteria difficult, if not impossible. The characteristics of complex emergencies will be difficult to reconcile into a well-formulated policy response that can be applied to many situations. The degree of state viability, the level of ethnic violence, the presence of economic deprivation and human suffering, and the cultural differences and challenges of each unique complex emergency must be considered. The intervening nations must also factor in their national interests, the feasible outcomes, the acceptable costs, the anticipated duration, and the desired end state.

Reluctance to intervene will be the norm. Even where intervention is justifiable, improved criteria improvements are necessary to allow for better and more timely policy decisions. Specific improvements are needed in defining the concepts of humanitarian interests and intervention, clarifying the proposed partiality of the intervening forces, and establishing viable and acceptable nation building processes. Further, a reassessment and potential cultural adjustment is needed to accept increased costs in time, resources, and lives for extended duration in those situations where such an intervention is warranted.

The concepts of humanitarian interests and humanitarian intervention must be carefully assessed in terms of national obligation and international precedent. The media influence on public perception will increase demands for action on humanitarian principles. These actions have consequences for international law and the nature of sovereignty. Declaring that the U.S. has humanitarian interests is a double-edged sword that must be carefully honed and judiciously applied to ensure the U.S. is prepared to accept the obligations such a policy entails.

When looking at the conduct of the intervention, the United States needs to reassess its thinking about several factors. It is important to recognize that impartiality is not desirable for all objectives or in all operations, and commitment must be structured appropriately. While impartiality is essential to peacekeeping, it is illusory and counterproductive to other MOOTW activities where U.S. actions create a real and perceived enabling of one or more parties to the dispute.

The U.S. also needs to reassess its reluctance to commit to nation building activities if humanitarian intervention is U.S. policy and the solution requires a long-term commitment. PDD-25 addresses commitment of American forces and implies a short-term action to create stability as the norm for future intervention. If the U.S. is to address the long-term problem, a more comprehensive program encompassing the entire complement of national instruments of power and their international counterparts must be developed.

Similarly, national leaders and the public must be reeducated on the trade-offs in intervention and add a measure of reality to the current expectations. Duration, degree of commitment of forces, and the desire for well defined exit conditions and deadlines drive policy toward short-term use of force. While this is often desirable, the U.S. must be cognizant of the fact that some situations will require a long-term military commitment. Although America may

hope to avoid such situations, it would be foolish to assume that there is no potential for U.S. involvement in a protracted situation.

Implications for Intervention Policy

The nature of complex emergencies has significant impacts on the broader intervention and foreign relations policies. PDD-25 addresses several criteria for intervention but does not focus on the implications to future policy and international law that may arise or should be considered. These possibilities for changes must be carefully approached and managed. These requirements include addressing the concept of self-deterrence and the potential loss of freedom of action it entails, the potential for earlier intervention and preventive deployments, and the loosening of restrictions from the concept of last resort. For successful application of any new potential, a more detailed predictive model is required. Finally, the utility of the model and any new approaches to intervention rest on a clear definition of national interests.

National interests are the foremost, and often determining, criterion for intervention. Great improvement and clarification is necessary here. Although PDD-25 notes the importance of interests, other strategic documents do not provide sufficient detail, clarity, and emphasis. As a result, each situation causes renewed debate of the interests involved, increasing time spent before action and permitting cases in which short-term objectives and capabilities determine policy without a basis in long-term strategy and interests.

Realizing that the broad interests must be applied and assessed in new situations prior to any commitment of forces, a more articulate and fully developed baseline is critical to the debate. Increased emphasis on the role of interests in guiding the establishment of objectives is imperative. The NSS needs to clearly articulate America's broad, enduring interests and then structure the security strategy toward achieving objectives which help the U.S. attain or maintain those interests. The strategy must also provide an initial link between the national interests and the

regionally-specific interests and concerns that must be considered as policy makers apply the general interests to a particular intervention decision.

Absent a well-defined interest, the present nature of the PDD-25 criteria may result in a limited, de facto imposition of American self-deterrence. The multiple criteria and the nature of the complex environment present a formidable case against intervention in these circumstances. Obviously, absolute self-deterrence will not result but U.S. interventions will most likely be limited to those cases which immediately threaten vital national interests and to those cases where the degree of suffering and violation of human rights eventually compel action. Even in these cases, the U.S. will most likely act reluctantly and delay action as long as possible. The current criteria, interests, and expectations will tend to limit U.S. involvement.

Given the current nature of American policy and interests, the numerous criteria of PDD-25, the complexity of the situation, and the public debate on whether national or humanitarian interests warrant intervention will likely preclude national command authorities from deciding to intervene while the crisis is still emerging. The U.S. needs to determine if the potential utility of preventive deployment and earlier, theoretically less costly introduction of forces is desirable. If this is the case, American leaders need to reconsider whether the concept of force as a last resort applies to MOOTW interventions.

The principle of last resort was designed as a just war dictum to determine whether the recourse to war was legitimate. Early MOOTW intervention raises the possibility of applying force to prevent ethnic/communal violence from exploding in order to reduce the need for future, larger application of force. The utility and applicability of the just war principle of last resort to non-war interventions must be debated if the U.S. is ever to approach embracing the potentially useful tool of early intervention and preventive deployment.

The current criteria of PDD-25 reflect most of the pertinent issues concerning intervention. There are a multitude of opinions on what causes the various complex emergencies and failed states. Presently, there are few integrated models of this phenomenon that allow for a predictive capability. As a fuller understanding of the MOOTW environment is developed, it must be matched with a predictive model that will facilitate identifying emerging hot spots and focusing appropriate MOOTW actions to correct root problems.

American intervention policy will have other broad international impacts that must be considered. The debate on multilateralism in peace operations involves limiting the freedom for unilateral action and increases the tendency toward a broader collective security regime. So far, PDD-25 has not surrendered any sovereignty of action. As U.N. precedence evolves, the norms of international relations will be redefined. The U.S. must be cognizant of the internationalist undercurrent in these actions. Additionally, the U.S. must recognize that even inaction or selective action carries broader implications in international norms and potential reactions by rogue actors and other adversaries.

Recommendations for Action

The above discussion of potentials to expand current conceptual frameworks, combined with the need for further revision and clarification of PDD-25 criteria, require several actions and decisions if America is to reap the maximum benefits that a more predictive and proactive policy might produce. Rather than provide an exhaustive list of actions required, the critical areas only are addressed here. Some entail more study, analysis, and synthesis to allow for incorporation into an overall comprehensive policy. Others require a decision that such change or expansion of policy is in America's interest. Still others require a conscientious modification of the American cultural mindset before implementation is possible. The required actions include:

1. Establish a specific, defined set of national interests to replace the present generic and unfocused priorities of the current NSS.

2. Reassess the applicability of the concept of last resort to MOOTW and confirm that military actions need not wait until all other means have failed.

3. Validate that the objectives and methods of nation building are occasionally in the national interest. Build an acceptable and feasible doctrine for nation building to correct the current avoidance of this issue.

4. Actively combat the almost-absolute predisposition of the public and of policy makers against any operation where costs are high, duration is long, and end state is vague. Interests should provide the guide around which the suitability of an intervention is assessed.

5. Combine the current concepts and models addressing complex emergencies and failed states (target state environment) with a robust model of U.S. interests, objectives, and capabilities in order to develop a useful predictive model of developing crises and prospective actions.

6. Insure that new policies and procedures are examined in terms of their impact on international law and the establishment of new national obligations.

The list of possible policy prescriptions for improving decision making in interventions could continue. Clearly, there is more work to be done to more fully understand the situations where intervention is possible and to craft criteria and models to assist in assessing and determining when intervention is appropriate. Presidential Decision Directive 25 has moved this dialogue forward and provides the current framework for assessing intervention decisions. In almost all circumstances, the ultimate decision will revolve around the perception of the national interests at stake, the degree of an international community consensus or legal precedence, and a realistic appraisal of the costs required and outcomes desired. These are the areas in most urgent need of attention.

APPENDIX

PRESIDENTIAL DECISION DIRECTIVE 25

**The Clinton Administration's
Policy on Reforming
Multilateral Peace Operations**

May 1994



**Key Elements of the Clinton Administration's Policy
on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations**

Introduction:

The Role of Peace Operations in U.S. Foreign Policy¹

Serious threats to the security of the United States still exist in the post-Cold War era. New threats will emerge. The United States remains committed to meeting such threats.

When our interests dictate, the U.S. must be willing and able to fight and win wars, unilaterally whenever necessary. To do so, we must create the required capabilities and maintain them ready to use. UN peace operations cannot substitute for this requirement.

Circumstances will arise, however, when multilateral action best serves U.S. interests in preserving or restoring peace. In such cases, the UN can be an important instrument for collective action. UN peace operations can also provide a "force multiplier" in our efforts to promote peace and stability.

During the Cold War, the United Nations could resort to multilateral peace operations only in the few cases when the interests of the Soviet Union and the West did not conflict. In the new strategic environment such operations can serve more often as a cost-effective tool to advance American as well as collective interests in maintaining peace in key regions and create global burden-sharing for peace.

Territorial disputes, armed ethnic conflicts, civil wars (many of which could spill across international borders) and the collapse of governmental authority in some states are among the current threats to peace. While many of these conflicts may not directly threaten American interests, their cumulative effect is significant. The UN has sought to play a constructive role in such situations by mediating disputes and obtaining agreement to cease-fires and political settlements. Where such agreements have been reached, the interposition of neutral forces under UN auspices has, in many cases, helped facilitate lasting peace.

¹For simplicity, the term peace operations is used in this document to mean the entire spectrum of activities from traditional peacekeeping to peace enforcement aimed at defusing and resolving international conflicts.

UN peace operations have served important U.S. national interests. In Cambodia, UN efforts led to an election protected by peacekeepers, the return of hundreds of thousands of refugees and the end of a destabilizing regional conflict. In El Salvador, the UN sponsored elections and is helping to end a long and bitter civil war. The UN's supervision of Namibia's transition to independence removed a potential source of conflict in strategic southern Africa and promoted democracy. The UN in Cyprus has prevented the outbreak of war between two NATO allies. Peacekeeping on the Golan Heights has helped preserve peace between Israel and Syria. In Former Yugoslavia, the UN has provided badly-needed humanitarian assistance and helped prevent the conflict from spreading to other parts of the region. UN-imposed sanctions against Iraq, coupled with the peacekeeping operation on the Kuwait border, are constraining Iraq's ability to threaten its neighbors.

Need for Reform

While serving U.S. interests, UN peace operations continue to require improvement and reform. Currently, each operation is created and managed separately, and economies of scale are lost. Likewise, further organizational changes at UN Headquarters would improve efficiency and effectiveness. A fully independent office of Inspector General should be established immediately. The U.S. assessment rate should be reduced to 25 per cent.

Since it is in our interest at times to support UN peace operations, it is also in our interest to seek to strengthen UN peacekeeping capabilities and to make operations less expensive and peacekeeping management more accountable. Similarly, it is in our interest to identify clearly and quickly those peace operations we will support and those we will not. Our policy establishes clear guidelines for making such decisions.

Role in U.S. Foreign Policy

UN and other multilateral peace operations will at times offer the best way to prevent, contain or resolve conflicts that could otherwise be more costly and deadly. In such cases, the U.S. benefits from having to bear only a share of the burden. We also benefit by being able to invoke the voice of the community of nations on behalf of a cause we support. Thus, establishment of a capability to conduct multilateral peace operations is part of our National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy.

While the President never relinquishes command of U.S. forces, the participation of U.S. military personnel in UN operations can, in particular circumstances, serve U.S. interests. First, U.S. military participation may, at times, be necessary to persuade others to participate in operations that serve U.S. interests. Second, U.S. participation may be one way to

exercise U.S. influence over an important UN mission, without unilaterally bearing the burden. Third, the U.S. may be called upon and choose to provide unique capabilities to important operations that other countries cannot.

In improving our capabilities for peace operations, we will not discard or weaken other tools for achieving U.S. objectives. If U.S. participation in a peace operation were to interfere with our basic military strategy, winning two major regional conflicts nearly simultaneously (as established in the Bottom Up Review), we would place our national interest uppermost. The U.S. will maintain the capability to act unilaterally or in coalitions when our most significant interests and those of our friends and allies are at stake. Multilateral peace operations must, therefore, be placed in proper perspective among the instruments of U.S. foreign policy.

The U.S. does not support a standing UN army, nor will we earmark specific U.S. military units for participation in UN operations. We will provide information about U.S. capabilities for data bases and planning purposes.

It is not U.S. policy to seek to expand either the number of UN peace operations or U.S. involvement in such operations. Instead, this policy, which builds upon work begun by previous administrations and is informed by the concerns of the Congress and our experience in recent peace operations, aims to ensure that our use of peacekeeping is selective and more effective. Congress must also be actively involved in the continuing implementation of U.S. policy on peacekeeping.

* * * *

I. Supporting the Right Peace Operations

i. Voting for Peace Operations

The U.S. will support well-defined peace operations, generally, as a tool to provide finite windows of opportunity to allow combatants to resolve their differences and failed societies to begin to reconstitute themselves. Peace operations should not be open-ended commitments but instead linked to concrete political solutions; otherwise, they normally should not be undertaken. To the greatest extent possible, each UN peace operation should have a specified timeframe tied to intermediate or final objectives, an integrated political/military strategy well-coordinated with humanitarian assistance efforts, specified troop levels, and a firm budget estimate. The U.S. will continue to urge the UN Secretariat and Security Council members to engage in rigorous, standard evaluations of all proposed new peace operations.

The Administration will consider the factors below when deciding whether to vote for a proposed new UN peace operation (Chapter VI or Chapter VII) or to support a regionally-sponsored peace operation:

- UN involvement advances U.S. interests, and there is an international community of interest for dealing with the problem on a multilateral basis.
- There is a threat to or breach of international peace and security, often of a regional character, defined as one or a combination of the following:
 - International aggression, or;
 - Urgent humanitarian disaster coupled with violence;
 - Sudden interruption of established democracy or gross violation of human rights coupled with violence, or threat of violence.
- There are clear objectives and an understanding of where the mission fits on the spectrum between traditional peacekeeping and peace enforcement.
- For traditional (Chapter VI) peacekeeping operations, a ceasefire should be in place and the consent of the parties obtained before the force is deployed.
- For peace enforcement (Chapter VII) operations, the threat to international peace and security is considered significant.
- The means to accomplish the mission are available, including the forces, financing and a mandate appropriate to the mission.
- The political, economic and humanitarian consequences of inaction by the international community have been weighed and are considered unacceptable.
- The operation's anticipated duration is tied to clear objectives and realistic criteria for ending the operation.

These factors are an aid in decision-making; they do not by themselves constitute a prescriptive device. Decisions have been and will be based on the cumulative weight of the factors, with no single factor necessarily being an absolute determinant.

In addition, using the factors above, the U.S. will continue to scrutinize closely all existing peace operations when they come

up for regular renewal by the Security Council to assess the value of continuing them. In appropriate cases, the U.S. will seek voluntary contributions by beneficiary nations or enhanced host nation support to reduce or cover, at least partially, the costs of certain UN operations. The U.S. will also consider voting against renewal of certain long-standing peace operations that are failing to meet established objectives in order to free military and financial resources for more pressing UN missions.

ii. Participating in UN and Other Peace Operations

The Administration will continue to apply even stricter standards when it assesses whether to recommend to the President that U.S. personnel participate in a given peace operation. In addition to the factors listed above, we will consider the following factors:

- Participation advances U.S. interests and both the unique and general risks to American personnel have been weighed and are considered acceptable.
- Personnel, funds and other resources are available;
- U.S. participation is necessary for operation's success;
- The role of U.S. forces is tied to clear objectives and an endpoint for U.S. participation can be identified;
- Domestic and Congressional support exists or can be marshalled;
- Command and control arrangements are acceptable.

Additional, even more rigorous factors will be applied when there is the possibility of significant U.S. participation in Chapter VII operations that are likely to involve combat:

- There exists a determination to commit sufficient forces to achieve clearly defined objectives;
- There exists a plan to achieve those objectives decisively;
- There exists a commitment to reassess and adjust, as necessary, the size, composition, and disposition of our forces to achieve our objectives.

Any recommendation to the President will be based on the cumulative weight of the above factors, with no single factor necessarily being an absolute determinant.

II. The Role of Regional Organizations

In some cases, the appropriate way to perform peace operations will be to involve regional organizations. The U.S. will continue to emphasize the UN as the primary international body with the authority to conduct peacekeeping operations. At the same time, the U.S. will support efforts to improve regional organizations' peacekeeping capabilities.

When regional organizations or groupings seek to conduct peacekeeping with UNSC endorsement, U.S. support will be conditioned on adherence to the principles of the UN Charter and meeting established UNSC criteria, including neutrality, consent of the conflicting parties, formal UNSC oversight and finite, renewal mandates.

With respect to the question of peacekeeping in the territory of the former Soviet Union, requests for "traditional" UN blue-helmeted operations will be considered on the same basis as other requests, using the factors previously outlined (e.g., a threat to international peace and security, clear objectives, etc.). U.S. support for these operations will, as with other such requests, be conditioned on adherence to the principles of the UN Charter and established UNSC criteria.

III. Reducing Costs

Although peacekeeping can be a good investment for the U.S., it would be better and more sustainable if it cost less. The Administration is committed to reducing the U.S. share of peacekeeping costs to 25% by January 1, 1996, down from the current rate of 31.7%. We will also inform the UN of Congress's likely refusal to fund U.S. peacekeeping assessments at a rate higher than 25% after Fiscal Year 1995.

The Administration remains concerned that the UN has not rectified management inefficiencies that result in excessive costs and, on occasion, fraud and abuse. As a matter of priority, the U.S. will continue to press for dramatic administrative and management improvements in the UN system. In particular, the U.S. is working hard to ensure that new and on-going peace operations are cost-effective and properly managed. Towards this end, the U.S. is pursuing a number of finance and budget management reforms, including:

- immediate establishment of a permanent, fully independent office of Inspector General with oversight responsibility that includes peacekeeping;
- unified budget for all peace operations, with a contingency fund, financed by a single annual peacekeeping assessment;

- standing cadre of professional budget experts from member states, particularly top contributing countries, to assist the UN in developing credible budgets and financial plans;
- enlargement of the revolving peacekeeping reserve fund to \$500 million, using voluntary contributions;
- Required status of forces/mission agreements that provide preferential host nation support to peacekeeping operations;
- prohibit UN "borrowing" from peacekeeping funds to finance cash shortfalls in regular UN administrative operations;
- revise the special peacekeeping scale of assessments to base it on a 3-year average of national income and rationalize Group C so that higher income countries pay their regular budget rate.

Moreover, the U.S. will use its voice and vote in the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations to contain costs of UN peace operations once they are underway.

IV. Strengthening the UN

If peace operations are to be effective and efficient when the U.S. believes they are necessary, the UN must improve the way peace operations are managed. Our goal is not to create a global high command but to enable the UN to manage its existing load more effectively. At present each UN operation is created and managed separately by a still somewhat understaffed UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). As a result, support to the field may suffer, economies of scale are lost, and work is duplicated. Moreover, the UN's command and control capabilities, particularly in complex operations, need substantial improvement. Structural changes at UN Headquarters, some of which are already underway, would make a positive difference.

A. The U.S. proposals include the reconfiguration and expansion of the staff for the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to create:

- Plans Division to conduct adequate advance planning and preparation for new and on-going operations;
- Information and Research Division linked to field operations to obtain and provide current information, manage a 24 hour watch center, and monitor open source material and non-sensitive information submitted by governments;

- Operations Division with a modern command, control and communications (C3) architecture based on commercial systems;
- Logistics Division to manage both competitive commercial contracts (which should be re-bid regularly on the basis of price and performance) and a cost-effective logistics computer network to link the UN DPKO with logistics offices in participating member nations. This system would enable the UN to request price and availability data and to order materiel from participating states;
- Small Public Affairs cell dedicated to supporting on-going peace operations and disseminating information within host countries in order to reduce the risks to UN personnel and increase the potential for mission success;
- Small Civilian Police Cell to manage police missions, plan for the establishment of police and judicial institutions, and develop standard procedures, doctrine and training.

B. To eliminate lengthy, potentially disastrous delays after a mission has been authorized, the UN should establish:

- a rapidly deployable headquarters team, a composite initial logistics support unit, and open, pre-negotiated commercial contracts for logistics support in new missions;
- data base of specific, potentially available forces or capabilities that nations could provide for the full range of peacekeeping and humanitarian operations;
- trained civilian reserve corps to serve as a ready, external talent pool to assist in the administration, management, and execution of UN peace operations;
- modest airlift capability available through pre-negotiated contracts with commercial firms or member states to support urgent deployments.

C. Finally, the UN should establish a professional Peace Operations Training Program for commanders and other military and civilian personnel.

D. Consistent with the specific proposals outlined above, the U.S. will actively support efforts in the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly to redeploy resources within the UN to enable the effective augmentation of the UN DPKO along the lines outlined above. In addition, the U.S. is prepared to undertake the following, primarily on a reimbursable basis:

- detail appropriate numbers of civilian and military personnel to DPKO in New York in advisory or support roles;
- share information, as appropriate, while ensuring full protection of sources and methods;
- offer to design a command, control, and communications systems architecture for the Operations Division, using commercially available systems and software;
- offer to assist DPKO to establish an improved, cost-effective logistics system to support UN peacekeeping operations;
- offer to help design the database of military forces or capabilities and to notify DPKO, for inclusion in the database, of specific U.S. capabilities that could be made available for the full spectrum of peacekeeping or humanitarian operations. U.S. notification in no way implies a commitment to provide those capabilities, if asked by the UN;
- detail public affairs specialists to the UN;
- offer to help create and establish a training program, participate in peacekeeping training efforts and offer the use of U.S. facilities for training purposes.

V. Command and Control of U.S. Forces

A. Our Policy: The President retains and will never relinquish command authority over U.S. forces. On a case by case basis, the President will consider placing appropriate U.S. forces under the operational control of a competent UN commander for specific UN operations authorized by the Security Council. The greater the U.S. military role, the less likely it will be that the U.S. will agree to have a UN commander exercise overall operational control over U.S. forces. Any large scale participation of U.S. forces in a major peace enforcement mission that is likely to involve combat should ordinarily be conducted under U.S. command and operational control or through competent regional organizations such as NATO or ad hoc coalitions.

There is nothing new about this Administration's policy regarding the command and control of U.S. forces. U.S. military personnel have participated in UN peace operations since 1948. American forces have served under the operational control of foreign commanders since the Revolutionary War, including in World War I, World War II, Operation Desert Storm and in NATO since its inception. We have done so and will continue to do so when the President determines it serves U.S. national interests.

Since the end of the Cold War, U.S. military personnel have begun serving in UN operations in greater numbers. President Bush sent a large U.S. field hospital unit to Croatia and observers to Cambodia, Kuwait and Western Sahara. President Clinton has deployed two U.S. infantry companies to Macedonia in a monitoring capacity and logisticians to the UN operation in Somalia.

B. Definition of Command: No President has ever relinquished command over U.S. forces. Command constitutes the authority to issue orders covering every aspect of military operations and administration. The sole source of legitimacy for U.S. commanders originates from the U.S. Constitution, federal law and the Uniform Code of Military Justice and flows from the President to the lowest U.S. commander in the field. The chain of command from the President to the lowest U.S. commander in the field remains inviolate.

C. Definition of Operational Control: It is sometimes prudent or advantageous (for reasons such as maximizing military effectiveness and ensuring unity of command) to place U.S. forces under the operational control of a foreign commander to achieve specified military objectives. In making this determination, factors such as the mission, the size of the proposed U.S. force, the risks involved, anticipated duration, and rules of engagement will be carefully considered.

Operational control is a subset of command. It is given for a specific time frame or mission and includes the authority to assign tasks to U.S. forces already deployed by the President, and assign tasks to U.S. units led by U.S. officers. Within the limits of operational control, a foreign UN commander cannot: change the mission or deploy U.S. forces outside the area of responsibility agreed to by the President, separate units, divide their supplies, administer discipline, promote anyone, or change their internal organization.

D. Fundamental Elements of U.S. Command Always Apply: If it is to our advantage to place U.S. forces under the operational control of a UN commander, the fundamental elements of U.S. command still apply. U.S. commanders will maintain the capability to report separately to higher U.S. military authorities, as well as the UN commander. Commanders of U.S. military units participating in UN operations will refer to higher U.S. authorities orders that are illegal under U.S. or international law, or are outside the mandate of the mission to which the U.S. agreed with the UN, if they are unable to resolve the matter with the UN commander. The U.S. reserves the right to terminate participation at any time and to take whatever actions it deems necessary to protect U.S. forces if they are endangered.

There is no intention to use these conditions to subvert the operational chain of command. Unity of command remains a vital concern. Questions of legality, mission mandate, and prudence will continue to be worked out "on the ground" before the orders are issued. The U.S. will continue to work with the UN and other member states to streamline command and control procedures and maximize effective coordination on the ground.

E. Protection of U.S. Peacekeepers: The U.S. remains concerned that in some cases, captured UN peacekeepers and UN peace enforcers may not have adequate protection under international law. The U.S. believes that individuals captured while performing UN peacekeeping or UN peace enforcement activities, whether as members of a UN force or a U.S. force executing a UN Security Council mandate, should, as a matter of policy, be immediately released to UN officials; until released, at a minimum they should be accorded protections identical to those afforded prisoners of war under the 1949 Geneva Convention III (GPW). The U.S. will generally seek to incorporate appropriate language into UN Security Council resolutions that establish or extend peace operations in order to provide adequate legal protection to captured UN peacekeepers. In appropriate cases, the U.S. would seek assurances that U.S. forces assisting the UN are treated as experts on mission for the United Nations, and thus are entitled to appropriate privileges and immunities and are subject to immediate release when captured. Moreover, the Administration is actively involved in negotiating a draft international convention at the United Nations to provide a special international status for individuals serving in peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations under a UN mandate. Finally, the Administration will take appropriate steps to ensure that any U.S. military personnel captured while serving as part of a multinational peacekeeping force or peace enforcement effort are immediately released to UN authorities.

VI. Strengthening U.S. Support for Multilateral Peace Operations

Peace operations have changed since the end of the Cold War. They are no longer limited to the interposition of small numbers of passive, unarmed observers. Today, they also include more complex and sometimes more robust uses of military resources to achieve a range of political and humanitarian objectives.

The post-Cold War world has also witnessed the emergence of peace enforcement operations involving the threat or use of force. These missions have been considerably more challenging than traditional peacekeeping operations, yet the U.S. and the UN are only now beginning to change sufficiently the way they manage peace operations. The expansion of peacekeeping operations without a commensurate expansion of capabilities has contributed to noticeable setbacks. If the U.S. is to support the full range of peace operations effectively, when it is in

our interests to do so, our government, not just the UN, must adapt.

It is no longer sufficient to view peace operations solely through a political prism. It is critical also to bring a clear military perspective to bear, particularly on those missions that are likely to involve the use of force or the participation of U.S. combat units. Thus, the Department of Defense should join the Department of State in assuming both policy and funding responsibility for appropriate peace operations. We call this policy "shared responsibility."

A. Shared Responsibility: DOD will assume new responsibilities for managing and funding those UN peace operations that are likely to involve combat and all operations in which U.S. combat units are participating. The military requirements of these operations demand DOD's leadership in coordinating U.S. oversight and management. Professional military judgment increases the prospects of success of such operations. Moreover, with policy management responsibility comes funding responsibility.

DOD will pay the UN assessment for those traditional UN peacekeeping missions (so called "Chapter VI" operations, because they operate under Chapter VI of the UN Charter) in which U.S. combat units are participating, e.g. Macedonia. DOD will also pay the UN assessment for all UN peace enforcement missions (so called "Chapter VII" operations), e.g. Bosnia and Somalia. State will continue to manage and pay for traditional peacekeeping missions in which there are no U.S. combat units participating, e.g. Golan Heights, El Salvador, Cambodia.

When U.S. military personnel, goods or services are used for UN peace operations, DOD will receive direct and full reimbursement; reimbursement can only be waived in exceptional circumstances, and only by the President.

Our Shared Responsibility policy states: "Unless the President determines otherwise, at the request of one of the Principals:

- The State Department will have lead responsibility² for the oversight and management of those traditional

²Lead responsibility refers to the coordination of interagency oversight of the day-to-day conduct of an on-going peace operation. The lead agency will chair the interagency working group (IWG) established to coordinate policy related to a particular operation. The lead agency determines the agenda, ensures cohesion among agencies and is responsible for implementing decisions.

peacekeeping operations (Chapter VI) in which U.S. combat units are not participating. The Administration will seek to fund the assessments for these operations through the existing State Contributions for International Peacekeeping Activities account, and;

- The Defense Department will have lead responsibility for the oversight and management of those Chapter VI operations in which there are U.S. combat units and for all peace enforcement (Chapter VII) peace operations. The Administration will seek to fund the assessments for these operations through the establishment of a new account within DOD established to pay UN assessments. Once such an account is established, DOD may receive direct reimbursement from the UN for contributions of goods, services, and troops to UN peace operations."

The Administration will submit legislation to Congress creating a new peacekeeping assessment account for DOD and implementing the shared responsibility concept. The legislation will stipulate that, in all cases, the agency with lead responsibility for a given operation will be responsible for assessments associated with that operation.

Since peace operations are neither wholly military nor wholly political in nature, consisting instead of military, political, humanitarian and developmental elements in varying degrees, no one agency alone can manage all facets of an operation effectively. Therefore, the designated lead agencies will engage in full and regular interagency consultation as they manage U.S. support for peace operations.

In all cases, State remains responsible for the conduct of diplomacy and instructions to embassies and our UN Mission in New York. DOD is responsible for military assessments and activities. NSC facilitates interagency coordination.

B. Reimbursements from the UN: Under the shared responsibility policy, and the proposed accompanying legal authorities, DOD would receive and retain direct reimbursement for its contributions of troops, goods and services to the UN. An important advantage will be to limit any adverse impact on DOD Operations and Maintenance funds, which are essential to U.S. military readiness. As our draft legislation stipulates, the U.S. will seek full reimbursement from the UN for U.S. contributions of troops, good and services. The U.S. will first apply reimbursements against DOD incremental costs. Any remaining excess after the Services have been made whole would be credited to DOD's proposed peacekeeping account when it is a DOD-led operation or to State's CIPA account when it is a State-led operation. The President may choose to waive UN reimbursement only in exceptional circumstances.

C. U.S. Funding of UN Peace Operations: In the short term, the Administration will seek Congressional support for funding the USG's projected UN peacekeeping arrears. Over the long run, we view the shared responsibility approach outlined above as the best means of ensuring improved management and adequate funding of UN peace operations. Moreover, the Administration will make every effort to budget for known peacekeeping assessments and seek Congressional support to fund, in the annual appropriation, assessments for clearly anticipated contingencies.

D. U.S. Training: The Armed Services will include appropriate peacekeeping/emergency humanitarian assistance training in DOD training programs. Training U.S. forces to fight and decisively win wars will, however, continue to be the highest training priority.

VII. Congress and the American People

To sustain U.S. support for UN peace operations, Congress and the American people must understand and accept the potential value of such operations as tools of U.S. interests. Congress and the American people must also be genuine participants in the processes that support U.S. decision-making on new and on-going peace operations.

Traditionally, the Executive branch has not solicited the involvement of Congress or the American people on matters related to UN peacekeeping. This lack of communication is not desirable in an era when peace operations have become more numerous, complex and expensive. The Clinton Administration is committed to working with Congress to improve and regularize communication and consultation on these important issues. Specifically, the Administration will:

- Regularize recently-initiated periodic consultations with bipartisan Congressional leaders on foreign policy engagements that might involve U.S. forces, including possible deployments of U.S. military units in UN peace operations.
- Continue recently-initiated monthly staff briefings on the UN's upcoming calendar, including current, new, and expanded peace operations.
- Inform Congress as soon as possible of unanticipated votes in the UNSC on new or expanded peace operations.
- Inform Congress of UN command and control arrangements when U.S. military units participate in UN operations.

- Provide UN documents to appropriate committees on a timely basis.
- Submit to Congress a comprehensive annual report on UN peace operations.
- Support legislation along the lines of that introduced by Senators Mitchell, Nunn, Byrd and Warner to amend the War Powers Resolution to introduce a consultative mechanism and to eliminate the 60-day withdrawal provisions.

* * * *

Conclusion

Properly constituted, peace operations can be one useful tool to advance American national interests and pursue our national security objectives. The U.S. cannot be the world's policeman. Nor can we ignore the increase in armed ethnic conflicts, civil wars and the collapse of governmental authority in some states--crises that individually and cumulatively may affect U.S. interests. This policy is designed to impose discipline on both the UN and the U.S. to make peace operations a more effective instrument of collective security.

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